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SYNOPSIS
Author Nicholas F. Hayward
Title of Thesis The politics of a German town during the
Weimar Republic : Coburg 1918-1929.
Although a great volume of literature is available on inter-war Ger­
many for. the periods of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, there 
is a dearth of literature on politics at the local level. This means 
that there have been no analytical studies of the politics of local 
government in inter-war Germany despite the importance attached to 
local politics as the grass roots of national political patterns.
This study appraises the general situation in Germany at the end of the 
First World War and the impact of the subsequent 1 revolution1 on 
Coburg. After analysing the political issues involved in Coburg1s 
decision to sever all links with its former partner in Thuringia,Gotha, 
and unite with Bavaria, the thesis examines the roots of radicalism in 
Coburg via a study of the political activity of the Left and Right. 
Parallels are drawn to political activity in the broader context of 
Bavaria and the Reich, and the significance of the first public app­
earance of Hitler outside his Munich ’power-base* is considered as the 
events surrounding the ’Third German Day' in Coburg in 1922 are exam­
ined.
Attention is paid to the development of the hostile relations between 
the Republican central government in Berlin and the right-wing Nation­
alist state government in Munich as Bavaria becomes the haven for all 
shades of nationalist, anti-republican opinion. The effects on this 
relationship of events like the Hitler Putsch, the occupation of the 
Ruhr and the Allies’ reparations demands are considered,as is the pos-
(iii)
ition of Coburg as it becomes enmeshed in the arguments between Berlin 
and Munich.
.Finally, the thesis examines the significance of events in Coburg in 
1929 to the National Socialist movement locally, and nationally as 
Coburg becomes the first National Socialist administration in Germany.
(iv)
CHAPTER 1.
COBURG AND REICH BEFORE AND DURING THE GERMAN REVOLUTION.
The duchy of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was created in 1826 when the Saxe-Gotha- 
Altenburg line ceased with the death of the last duke. Saxe-Gotha, 
which lay in Thuringia, was then divided between its immediate neigh­
bours, with Duke Ernst I of Saxe-Coburg claiming the ’capital’, the 
district of Gotha. In negotiations, which involved conceding a small 
part of his duchy to the territory of Saxe-Meiningen, Duke Ernst I 
successfully secured the union of Saxe-Coburg with Gotha.^ From the 
outset it was difficult to see the union in anything but name only, for 
the main centres of Gotha and Coburg were around 100 kilometres apart, 
separated not only by the Thuringian forest but also by areas of Saxe- 
Meiningen territory, and even parts of Prussia. The=sheer. geographical 
distance between the two towns was certain to account for some discrep­
ancy of interests and some differences in the ways of life. From the 
earliest days of the union there was a very identifiable antagonism 
between them.
”... in the matter of the Coburg-Gotha Union, it was 
all the more impossible to come to a decision as the 
chief councillors of both lands hindered each other in 
the most I jealous manner...11 (2)
The union was anything but natural, bringing together two 'peoples’ of 
quite different character, whose social structures differed quite 
widely, and whose economic and political systems were to prove a con­
tinuous source of conflict throughout the 92 year history of the 
united duchies.^
(1)
Politically, Coburg was something of a progressive district by German 
standards at that time, in that since 1821 it had been governed by a 
constitutional monarchy with an elected district assembly. Gotha, on 
the other hand, was deeply rooted in the old f.eudalistic system, and 
despite reforms in 1829 which were aimed at bringing Gotha’s constit­
ution into line with that of Coburg, throughout their joint history, 
the two never really functioned as a single unit. Both elected their 
own district assemblies which would then, on occasions, hold joint
sittings, and in essence there were two separate administrative struct-
(4)ures; one for Coburg's affairs, the other for Gotha’s affairs.
Economically, Coburg was always the more prosperous partner, having
developed from the Middle Ages as an important trading centre on the
busy trading route running through the valley from Augsburg and Nuern-
(5)berg to Northern Germany. Gotha, in contrast, seemed somehow
’time-locked' in its restrictive feudal practices which the nineteenth 
century dukes seemed reluctant to change:
"Doubtful matters soon came to light; release from 
all feudal burdens as regarded all rights of pasture...
The assurance of a supply of wood for the wants of the 
people... The first blast of the furious hurricane of 
political senselessness sometimes struck me as being 
rather comical."(6)
That pattern of rule prevailed upto the outbreak of the First World 
War, the consequences:of :whiah were to leave the twentieth century 
Duke, Carl Eduard, in no such position to dictate the pace of any 
change to the people of Coburg-Gotha. Events in Germany in 1918 
threatened to sweep away the old order and radically alter the polit­
ical power structure in the post-war Reich. The extent to which this 
did occur is the main focus of attention in the subsequent pages of
(2)
this study.
After some three and a half years at war, what was to be the final 
year - 1918 - started with Germany seemingly in a position of some 
strength. Hindenburg and Ludendorff could gear all Germany^re­
sources to a total war effort.for, despite an ever increasing call for
peace moves at home, the civilian government in Berlin presented little
(7)or no constraint to the Army commanders.
On the Reich’s borders there was good cause for feelings of confidence, 
with the now Bolshevik Russia pulling out of the war and entering into
(g\peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. This offered Germany not only
the opportunity to transfer troops across to the Western Front, but it
also made available further supplies of foodstuffs and war materials
from Russia. The position on the Western Front had, in fact, been
improving, as throughout the winter of 1917-1918 Ludendorff*s forces
had remained on the defensive and had enjoyed some considerable success
(9)in repelling the huge Allied offensives. The Austrian victory over 
the Italians at Caporetto in October 1917 had also helped as British 
and French troops had to be sent to the aid of their Italian allies!'1'0 ^
On the debit side was the fact that the aim of starving Britain into 
capitulation by unrestricted submarine warfare, as demanded so vocif­
erously by the Supreme Command of the German Reichswehr, had seriously
backfired. Not only had this plan failed to achieve its main aim, but
(11)it had also drawn the United States into the war. It soon became
evident, too, that despite hopes of the October Revolution in Russia 
aiding Germany’s cause, that cause was, if anything, in danger of 
being undermined as ideas about proletarian revolution began to spread
(3)
into the Reich. Despite the reported successes on the war.front, many 
Germans were frustrated by the lack of any corresponding improvement to 
conditions at home where the overriding concern was the severe food 
shortage resulting from the cruel winter of 1916 - 1917 which had left 
millions of people hungry and with serious misgivings about the effects 
war was having on them. The calls for international peace triggered by 
the ’revolutionaries* in Russia were increasingly attractive to neigh­
bouring Germany where the people were facing still greater hardship as 
the harsh winter of 1917 - 1918 threatened even worse shortages of food 
than the previous winter.
With this background of domestic unease, Ludendorff decided that his 
forces would have to mount an offensive in the West -in the spring of 
1918. Initial successes were recorded as the Allies were pushed back 
to the River Marne and maximum propaganda value was extracted as rep­
orts of a ’victory offensive’ spread through the Reich, with ’news’ of 
the impending collapse of the Allied Front and imminent German victory. 
When the German advance soon came to a halt, however, so did precise 
news of exactly how the German.Reichswehr was faring. What had, in 
fact, happened was that the German advance had been checked by General
(13)Foch and his French forces. In July 1918 Foch then launched a
counter-offensive and on August 8th, backed by thirteen British divis­
ions with the support of 450 tanks, he dealt thecGerman forces a blow 
which Ludendorff described as:
(14)"... the black day of the Germany Army.”
The Allies overwhelmed German positions between the Somme and the Luce,
(15)taking some 16,000 prisoners in the process. Even before the
launching of this counter-offensive troop morale amongst the Germans .
(4)
had begun to waver, and indiscipline was breaking out, particularly
when the soldiers discovered for themselves that the Allied forces
were not nearly as badly provisioned as they had been led to believe.
Looting and drinking then became serious probl-ems amongst the lower
11 f))ranks of the Reichswehr.
To add to the German High Command’s difficulties there was also the
problem of dissent amongst the large numbers of troops now on the
Western Front who had been transferred from the Russian border where
they had been ’exposed’ to Bolshevik propaganda. Similarly a number of
other troops had been subjected to the propaganda of the Spartacus
letters and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards whilst deployed in Berlin
(17)during the January strikes.
Throughout it all, though, Hindenburg and Ludendorff refused publicly 
to concede victory and persisted in their talk of ’wearing down’ the 
enemy. As Richard Watt documents, however, Ludendorff appears to have 
chosen his words with some care when replying to questions from Govern­
ment officials:
"In July the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Paul 
von Hintze, asked Ludendorff bluntly whether he was 
’certain of finally and decisively beating the enemy’.
’I can reply to that with a decided yes’, was Ludendorff’s 
answer... A month later the furthest that Ludendorff 
would go was to admit that the German Army was no longer 
capable of a ’great offensive’ although he claimed that 
by a skilful defensive policy he could break the Allies’ 
morale so that they would sue for peace." (18).
August and September continued to produce major setbacks for the German 
Army with no sign of the slightest crack in Allied morale. On the 
contrary, with American troops pouring into France, the Allies were
(5)
producing a vigorous offensive along the Western Front. Perhaps more
decisively, Germany’s friends were failing to hold back the Allies on
b.thertfronts, and Ludendorff1 s nerve finally broke when Bulgaria was
forced to sue for an armistice oh 29th September 1918, thus exposing
the Central Powers1 southern flank. Ludendorff immediately advised
Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Chancellor that the war could not be won,
and that the Chancellor must approach the President of the United
(19)States of America, Wilson, at once to seek an ;armistice.
Ludendorff1s advice was that the Chancellor should seek a peace based 
on Wilsons "Fourteen Points.
Ludendorff was removed from his post for fear that his retention would 
jeopardise any negotiations with President Wilson, in view of the 
President’s conviction that a lasting peace could only be concluded 
between democratic states. Being clearly identified with the old, 
imperial, autocratic regime, Ludendorff’s presence in high office 
could well be a sticking point preventing a successful outcome to neg­
otiations with America. The Chancellor, von Hertling, .also resigned 
and was replaced by Prince Max von Baden. Prince Max was presented 
with this assessment of the war situation by Field Marshal von Hinden- 
burg::
i’The German Army still stands firm and successfully 
wards off attacks. But the situation becomes daily 
more critical and may force the supreme Command to 
take momentous decisions.
It is desirable in the circumstances to break off the 
battle in order to spare the German people and its 
allies useless sacrifices. Every day wasted costs 
thousands of brave soldiers their lives." (21)
This desperate account of the military situation, coupled with growing
(6)
political agitation for peace and general social unrest in many areas 
of the Reich, left the new Chancellor with little choice but to seek 
an accommodation with the enemy. This he did immediately in a letter 
addressed to President Wilson: .
"The German Government requests the President of the 
United States of America to take in hand the restor­
ation of peace, to bring this request .to the notice 
of all belligerent states and to invite them to send 
plenipotentiaries for the initiation of negotiations.
They accept as a basis for the peace negotiations the
programme laid down by the President of the United
States of America,■‘.in his message to Congress of 8th 
January, 1918" (22)
In a further attempt to persuade President Wilson to negotiate seri­
ously with Germany as a democratic state, the German Government intro­
duced immediate proposals for the liberalisation of the political 
system. Following Ludendorff’s dismissal, Prince Max von Baden intro­
duced a series of constitutional changes which were passed by the 
Reichstag on 28th October 1918 and which therefore constituted a reply 
to President Wilson’s earlier charge that the German Government had
not made any moves since first suing for peace to alter the existing
(23)power structure. It was hoped that these reforms were the first 
stage in establishing a parliamentary democracy in Germany but, though 
they promised much, they came too late.
Within a week or so of the passing of these reforms Germany was envel­
oped in domestic turmoil. The realisation that by the end of October 
Germany was on the verge of surrender came as a sudden shock to a 
German people who for months, had been led to believe that Ludendorff s 
offensive in the spring, following Russia's withdrawal from the war, 
had virtually brought the Allies to their knees. The German people had 
received no news of the success of the Allied counter-offensive, and
(7)
news that the Supreme Command of the Reichswehr was now requesting an 
armistice because the military situation was so hopeless created 
panic and uncertainty which spilled over into popular revolt.
Although the Independent Socialists (U.S.P.D.) had been agitating for
a 'revolutionary programme' of reform in Germany, events now referred
to as the 'German Revolution' were largely spontaneous outbursts of
(24)popular dissent. The left-wing parties were, in fact, ill-
prepared to exploit the situation when revolution came, as even
amongst the Independent Socialists there seemed to be an obvious lack
of conviction as.to whether the working class would actually be able
(25)to overthrow the mighty German state. That events in November
1918 were precipitated rather by popular pressure resulting from the 
devastating news of military surrender and the ever-present food 
shortages than by any deep-rooted political motivation for revolut­
ionary change is reflected by reports from within the Reich's borders. 
A representative of the Saxon Government commented on 24th October in 
Berlin:
"Two moods are predominant among the masses. The first 
is a yearning for peace which has now grown to an extreme 
pitch. The second is an unmistakable bitterness over 
the fact that previous governments did not recognise the 
limits of German strength but went on nourishing the 
belief in Germany's invincibility..."(26)
The persistent refusal of the Kaiser to abdicate also fuelled popular
discontent because he was seen as a major obstacle to the start of
peace negotiations on the basis of President Wilson's 'Fourteen 
(27)Points'. The 'last straw' was, however, to occur when, in the
port of Kiel, naval chiefs ordered the fleet to sea at the end of
(8)
.October to undertake what must have seemed a last-ditch operation in 
the English Channel with little, if any, chance of success. The 
sailors refused to obey the command and so the Kiel mutiny began, and 
with it the German Revolution as the first Workers1 and Soldiers1 
Council was established.
It was to be only a matter of days before similar outbreaks of dissent 
had spread to all regions of the Reich, including many of the rural 
areas in the south like Coburg.
"In den Novembertagen des Jahres 1918 war auch die 
Buergerschaft unserer kerndeutschen Stadt Coburg auf 
die Versprechung von Freiheit, Schoenheit und Wuerde 
hereingefallen, die damals unserem Volk von den (28)
Nutzniessern des Novemberverbrechens gemacht wuerden."
Werner Faber, who held one of the mayoral positions in Coburg in 1932
when Coburg’s council had a National Socialist majority, made it
patently obvious how he and his fellow National Socialists viewed the
(29)events of November 1918 in Germany. Whilst perhaps not viewing
events in exactly the same light, Coburg’s leading official during 
those early days of ’revolution’ in 1918, Hermann Quarck, was alarmed 
at events. He and the military commander in Coburg, Oberstleut-
nant von Erffa,were more concerned about attempts to influence events 
in Coburg by radical groups from other regions than they were about 
any action the Coburg Socialists might take. In particular their 
suspicions fell on Gotha where, during the earliest hours of the
(31)’Revolution’ a Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council had been established.
Von Erffa had initially told Staatsrat Hermann Quarck that he had his
soldiers well in hand, but then von Erffa took rather an astonishing
(32)and quite decisive step. On 9th November 1918 he called together
(9)
his troops in the Coburg garrison and gave what amounted to a farewell
address. He told his men that he was speaking to them possibly for 1
the last time in the light of recent events throughout the Reich.
On the advice of his General Command in Kassel, he suggested that the
garrison elect a Soldiers’ Council now, in order to avoid any violent
(33)conflict with the authorities. Von Erffa also hoped that in
setting up a Soldiers’ Council, the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council 
(W.S.C.) in Gotha would not see any need to interfere in matters in 
Coburg.(3A)
Von Erffa’s action had dealt a blow to Quarck who had been feeling
secure in the knowledge that should there be the merest hint of civil
(35)disorder, he would be able to call on the military. Quarck’s
immediate reaction was to phone von Erffa’s superiors in Kassel to 
make an official complaint about the Coburg Commander’s behaviour, 
but he simply learnt for himself that the General Command was working
with the W.S.Cs. all over the Reich. Von Erffa subsequently told
Quarck that he, Quarck, was grossly underestimating the strength of 
the present ’revolutionary’ movement and that it would be a grave 
mistake, and a costly one in lives, to try to resist any attempt to 
block the establishment of W.S.Cs. Von Erffa added that should Quarck 
still be determined to hold out, then his only recourse was to use his
/ O C  \own civil authority and call on the police.
Despite this ’’Versagen”, or ’betrayal’, as he saw it, Quarck was det-
(37)ermined to maintain a firm grip on the course of events. He
summoned a meeting between representatives of the executive of the 
Coburg District Socialist Party, the deputy Mayor of Coburg, Comm­
ander von Erffa, and two other representatives of the Coburg mili-
(10)
( 38)tary. Quarck proposed delaying the formation of a W.S.C. until
(39)the situation throughout the Reich had become clearer. Although
not quite as derisive about left-wing moves to form these councils as 
Faber in his comment above, Quarck did question the very need for a 
W.S.C. in Coburg:
"... ob ein Vorgehen, wie es hier geplant,ueberhaupt 
fuer Coburg notwendig sei ... wenn die Coburger im 
Einvernehmen mit den Behoerden alles selbst ordneten."(40)
Quarck1s plea for the postponement of any action was turned down by
the Socialists, and their party newspaper, the 'Coburger Volksblatt',
printed an article on November 11th calling for a general strike and
(41)demonstration through the streets. The tone of the article would,.
however, have met with Quarck1s approval for it called for calm,
orderly behaviour, and warned against any acts of looting or violence.
The paper also gave assurances to the Coburg people on a matter of
great concern to them, as well as to people throughout the Reich: the
(42)"Magenfrage" or food factor. Few people in the Reich were, in
fact, in so fortunate a position as those in Coburg who could be given
assurances that supplies of food were sufficient to last until the
(43)New Year at the very least. In one demand, however, the Left did
not remain completely 'moderate'. To Quarck's dismay, Coburg, as
Gotha, took up the call for the abdication of Carl Eduard, who was
the duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha at that time. The Kaiser had finally
departed in the early days of 'Revolution', as had most^of the German
(44)Princes, so why not the Duke? Carl Eduard was attacked in part­
icular for his English descent, as a grandson of Queen Victoria and 
Prince Albert. In apparent reference to the historical notion of the 
'Divine Right of Kings' in Britain, the 'Coburger Volksblatt' cutting-
(11)
ly remarked:
"Oder glaubt er vielleicht als Auslaender ein 
besonderes Anrecht fvon Gottes Gnaden’ auf seinen 
Herrschersitz zu haben?" (45) •
At two o’clock in the afternoon of 11th November, some 1,000 people 
answered the Socialist call to gather for a demonstration. Little, 
if any, support came from other towns like Gotha, so the demonstration 
set off to wind its way peacefully through the Coburg town centre to 
the Town Hall. Here, representatives of Coburg’s provisional W.S.C. 
secured from Coburg town councillors recognition of their right to 
oversee all administrative acts. Apparently satisfied, the W.S.C. rep­
resentatives then left the town officials to carry on as normal and 
made their way to the buildings of the state ministry. Here, however, 
they met with a blunt refusal from Staatsrat Quarck to give any such 
recognition to W.S.C. rights regarding the affairs of the Coburg state. 
Quarck based his refusal on the oath of loyalty he had taken to the 
Duke and the present constitution, neither of which had yet been re­
placed. Quarck emphasised that he would continue in office as
before, at least until the next joint meeting of the Coburg and Gotha
District Councils, scheduled for 14th November 1918, where the question
(47)of the Duke’s position was likely to be raised. Quarck did agree
to do whatever lay in his power to ensure food supplies over the coming 
months provided that the Coburg W.S.C. agreed to co-operate in the 
maintenance of law and order. This was agreed and the W.S.C. repres­
entatives then'.led the demonstration to the Ehrenburg Palace where the 
final act of ’revolution’ took place.
From a balcony in the palace, leading Socialist figures read out the
(12)
so-called "Kriegsartikel" in which emphasis was laid on the importance
of electing a W.S.C. to work for the reconstruction of the country and.
(49)a better future.
In general terms, events in Coburg had followed much the same pattern 
as events elsewhere in the Reich during these initial days of devol­
ution’. When Quarck bluntly rejected all claims by the W.S.C. to any 
real sharing of power, the Socialists clearly did not know how to • 
react. They were consequently outmanoeuvred by an astute Quarck who 
managed to harness Socialist support to a defence of the ’status quo’. 
An early opportunity to initiate change had thus been lost, and from 
this point on, established interests in Coburg began to reassert 
themselves as the conservatism inherent in..Coburg society emerged 
during-the following years of turmoil and'uncertainty.to stifle any 
hope of a fundamental democratisation of'the political system.
W.S.Cs. throughout the Reich were quickly reduced to performing sim­
ilar supervisory functions. The revolution remained ’unfinished’ in 
the words of Karl Dietrich Bracher:
"The old power structure survived within the new 
framework:.the social,economic, and bureaucratic 
balance of power was preserved with only minor 
changes. The bankruptcy of the old forces, though 
obvious, was not followed by any real orientation 
and restructuring. Instead, the democrats put 
themselves into the hands of the military and the 
old civil servants, who knew how to exploit this 
co-operation without themselves changing.’1 (50)
By November 6th the message of ’revolution’ had been carried by the 
Keil sailors to all the major ports and most of the larger towns and
(51)cities. The W.S.Cs. which were springing up throughout the Reich
(13)
were a rapidly improvised form of self-government which expressed the
popular feeling of discontent at that time, and which slipped into
the political vacuum created as the old order seemingly began to
collapse in the face of defeat. In fact, although Revolutionary1
in form, perhaps, by the way in which they claimed executive powers
of government over their own areas, the Councils, in general, made
little attempt to remove the old bureaucracy, but rather co-existed
with it. In doing this, the W.S.Cs. allowed themselves to be very
quickly reduced to little more than ’rubber-stamp* authority for the
old imperial officers and bureaucrats who were allowed to remain and
(52)continue with the day-to-day running of the country. In many
respects it was ironic that the W.S.Cs. were persuaded to concentrate 
on maintaining law and order during these troubled times:
"... the control of the bureaucracy by the Workers' 
and Soldiers’ Councils did not seriously interfere 
with the working of the well-established machine, 
but in practice upheld its authority.”(53)
The tone of the ’revolution’ had, in fact, already been set by events
in Berlin during those early November days. Unable to hold back the
tide of events any longer, Prince Max von Baden, who until that time
had been Imperial Chancellor, handed over the seals of his office to 
(54)Friedrich Ebert. Ebert was the leader of the Majority Socialists
(55)and in him, Prince Max was convinced he had chosen the right man:
”... a man determined to fight the revolution*tooth 
and nail...” (56)
This confidence in Ebert as the 'right man' seemed well justified when 
Ebert, who retained the title 'Imperial Chancellor’, held his now
(14)
famous telephone conversation with General von Groener, Ludendorff1s 
replacement as Quartermaster General, a matter of hours after accept­
ing the seals of office from Prince Max. The significance of this 
conversation was in the consensus reached between the two men that the 
great threat facing Germany was Bolshevism following the October 
Revolution in Russia. An agreement was reached that the Army would
co-operate with the civilian government in suppressing any such Bol-
(5 7 )shevik threat within the Reich’s borders.
"But by taking a position against an overrated radical 
Left, the Social Democrats found themselves dependent 
on the Army, the Free Corps,(58) and the civil service 
bureaucracy, which promptly put rigid limits on the 
further democratisation of state and society.”(59)
Bracher argues that it was a fatal mistake by the Socialists to become 
dependent on the counter-revolutionary ’Freikorps’ for the maintenance 
of internal ’order’, because in so doing, Ebert was unable to prevent 
the kind of violence which culminated in the murders of Rosa Luxemburg 
and Karl Liebknecht by the Freikorps, and later in the murders of 
Government ministers like Matthias Erzberger and Walter Rathenau by 
nationalists.
’’This was the setting in which the radical Right 
counter-movement had its beginnings. Soon it was 
directed not only against the revolution, but 
against the democratic Republic-itself. The 
political career of Corporal Adolf Hitler, stationed 
in Munich, also had its beginnings in this anti­
revolutionary atmosphere."(61)
In fact, as Hitler began to build up his German Workers’ Party, the
ranks of the party membership were swelled with former ’Freikorps’
(62)men who came to form the nucleus of the notorious S.A. It was
(15)
this link with the Army that was so crucial to Hitler’s rise to power:
’’Without the unique position of the Army in Germany, and 
especially in Bavarian politics ... Hitler would, never 
have been able to exercise with impunity his methods of 
incitement, violence and intimidation. At every step 
from 1914 to 1945 Hitler’s varying relationship to the Army was of the greatest importance to him: never 
more so in these early days in Munich when without 
the Army’s patronage, Hitler would have found the 
greatest difficulty in climbing the first steps of 
his political career”. (63)
The stubborness of the Kaiser in refusing to abdicate was matched in
Coburg by the unwillingness of Duke Carl'Eduard to give in to pressure
for.his removal. The eventual abdication of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-
Gotha was, in the end, due ihuch more to pressure from Socialists in
Gotha than anything Coburg’s left-wing did or said. As early as 9th
November 1918 at a public meeting called by the Gotha Socialists on
the market place in Gotha, cries went up for Carl Eduard's abdication,
and he was, in fact, declared ’deposed' as from that very moment by
some speakers at the meeting. The Duke’s minister in Gotha,
Staatsminister Bassewitz, received a set of demands from Wilhelm Bock,
leader of the Gotha Socialists, calling for immediate reforms and,
above alii the Duke's abdication. In Bassewitz's report to the Duke
and his officials in Coburg it seemed clear that the Gotha Socialists
were intent upon removing the Duke, forcibly if necessary, should this
not be the outcome of the joint meeting of the Coburg District Assemb-
l 1lies called for 14th November. At this joint assembly, Bassewitz
delivered the following address on Carl Eduard’s behalf:
"In einem am Morgen des 9 Novembers eingegangenen 
Schreiben hat die sozialdemokratische Fraktion des 
Landtages die alsbaldige Einberufung des Landtages 
beantragt. Diesem Antrag ist so schnell die 
schwierigen Verkehrsverhaeltnisse es erlaubten,
(16)
entsprochen worden. Unterdessen ist Deutschland 
eine auf sozialistischer Grundlage beruhende 
Republik geworden, in deren Rahmen kein Raum fuer 
das Fortbestehen von Einzelmonarchie ist. Damit 
hat der Herzog aufgehoert,iin den Herzogtuemern 
Coburg und Gotha zu regieren. Er hat alle Beamten 
von dem ihm geleisteten Eid entbunden. Auch 
weiterhin ist er beseelt von dem aufrichtigen 
Wunsch fuer das Wohl seiner bisherigen Landeskinder 
und unseres armen, geschlagenen Vaterlandes.n(66)
To all intents and purposes this declaration signalled the end of the
duchy of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha although as Juergen Erdmann points out, its
clever wording meant that despite having relinquished rule of the
joint duchy, the Duke had managed to leave the way clear for his family
to take up its privileged position in Coburg, should the political
situation in the Reich dhange. The declaration stated only that there
(67)was no room for a monarchistic. figurehead in a socialist republic.
Shortly after the dissolution of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha the old rivalry
between the two states surfaced again, epitomised by the action of the
r *-u TT c  r It declared that:Gotha W.S.C.
"Nachdem der Herzog aufgehoert hat zu regieren, tritt 
bis auf weiteres in alien gemeinschaftlichen und gotha- 
ischen Angelegenheiten, in denen der Herzog nach 
Verfassung und Gesetz bisher zustaendig gewesen war 
der Vollzugsausschuss des ASR Gotha an seine Stelle".(69)
This brought a sharp reply from the Coburg Staatsministerium which, 
with the full backing of the Coburg W.S.C. declared that any interfer­
ence by Gotha in purely Coburg affairs would not be tolerated, as such 
decisions were exclusively the preserve of CoburgTs decision-making 
bodies. The extent to which the Coburg W.S.C. could be counted
amongst the decision-making bodies was, however, characterised by a 
special agreement reached between the W.S.C. and the State ministry on
(17)
(71)18th November 1918. This agreement left the old monarchistic
administrative system virtually intact, pushing the W.S.C. into some­
thing of a consultative role at best, and at worst, a body which lent
(72)a cover of respectability to the continuation*of the old order.
With the splitting up of the duchy of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha the important
question now facing Coburg was how it could best shape its political
and economic future. In the early days it had looked as if a ’Frei-
staat Coburg’ might be a distinct possibility since, despite having
to contribute its full share to the Reich’s war effort, at the end of
1918 Coburg was in a relatively strong economic position because of
(73)the tight control exercised over its finances. The first task in
establishing Coburg as a ’Freistaat’ would have been to organise 
elections for a new District Assembly to replace the now defunct 
Coburg-Gotha joint assembly. The W.S.C. realised, however, that in 
this they faced something of a dilemma. The original aim of the 
W.S.Cs. had been to remove the old order and effect a new, centralised.
Socialist Republic, but to establish Coburg as a ’Freistaat’ obvi­
ously ran contrary to this aim. The W.S.C. therefore advocated de­
caying any decisive move on Coburg’s future until a new National
Assembly had been elected which could then itself settle the question
(74)of Coburg’s future. The Left-in Coburg soon fell prey, however,
to the arguments of the ’old order’ about the urgent need to take
steps to protect Coburg’s rich cultural heritage, such as the Duke’s
residences and property, the theatre and the art collection in the
castle. To the people of Coburg this was a very serious issue of
concern which was later to play a decisive role in determining Coburns 
(75)future. But even for the present this argument was significant
enough to persuade the W.S.C. to approve the calling of elections to
(18)
/ rjr \a new District Assembly on 9th February 1919.
The result of the elections was an absolute majority for the Social 
Democrats who won fifty-nine percent of the vote, and at one of the 
first meetings of the'new assembly in March 1919 a three-man govern­
ment was elected: from the S.P.D., Franz Klinger and Reinhold Artmann
(77)together with the Duke’s former ’prime minister*, Hermann Quarck. To 
what extent the election of Quarck was a mark of gratitude and respect 
to the leading figure from the ’old days’ is uncertain, but the Soc­
ialists together with the other parties in the Assembly elected Quarck
(78)unanimously, to the third government seat. It is possible that
this was a calculated move by the Socialists in the belief that . 
Quarck’s experience, and obvious respect in the community, might prove 
very useful in the months to come. This would, of course, presuppose 
some awareness or experience on the part of the Socialists with regard 
to practical politics, yet it does, however, then seem rather short­
sighted of them to lay down in the standing orders for government 
meetings that the head of the government alone should decide how often 
the three-man ’cabinet’ should meet, particularly when the Socialists- 
agreed that Quarck should be the new head of government! Moreover, 
in emergencies, presidential-like powers would be vested in the govern­
ment head, whereby he could take decisions without consulting his 
’cabinet’.{79 *
Within just six months, therefore, of the Duke being deposed, the 
’revolutionary’ movement in Coburg had replaced him with a like-minded 
minister who, in times of crisis, was empowered to govern alone. It 
is difficult to see this as anything but an example of the shallowness 
and hesitancy of any progressive tendencies in CoburgjTand as such, a
(19)
distant echo of the failure of the previous German revolution in 1848, 
when the ambivalence which was felt by the liberalist movement with 
regard to change in Germany, helped pave the way for doubt and anxiety 
which then undermined their political efforts*in the second half of - 
the nineteenth century and thus allowed conservatism to re-emerge. 
Quarck himself must have been astonished at events of the preceding 
six months when, on the point of resignation during the early phase 
of the revolution in November 1918, he had denounced the middle class­
es for their betrayal of the ’old order’. They had, according to 
Quarck, taken up the cause of democracy:
”... aus einfacher, feiger mimikry und aus
Futterkrippendrang.”(81)
Now, not only was he back 'at the top’ with middle class support, but 
with the support of the Socialists as well.
(20)
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CHAPTER 2.
COBURG1S CHOICE
On New Year’s Day, 1919, the ’Coburger Zeitung', one of Coburg’s daily 
newspapers, ran the front page headlines:
”Mit Gott hinein ins Jahr 1 9 1 9 " ^
This was a typical prayer of those who represented Germany’s estab­
lished interests as the Reich found itself facing what the ’Coburger
Zeitung’ referred to as ’anarchy’ at home, and political and economic
(2)enslavement by the foreign enemy. At home, the uncertainty of the
political situation was exacerbated by the return of demobbed soldiers
who put extra pressure on the crumbling Germany economy and uncertain
social order as they headed into the larger towns and cities in search.
of employment. Abroad, peace was being laid down on Germany in the
form of the Versailles Treaty, which the 'Coburger Zeitung’ later came
to refer to as the ’Vernichtungsfriede' - the ’crushing peace’ with
(3)its highly significant guilt clause.
Initially there had been some hope that Coburg might survive as an in-
(4)dependent, free state. The ’Magenfrage’ was advanced as an argu­
ment in favour of Coburg remaining independent, particularly as feel­
ings amongst members of Coburg’s Chamber of Commerce had been running
high at the unfair treatment they believe Coburg to have received as
(5)a partner in the Thuringian food-production economy. Coburg's most 
influential statesman at that time, Hermann Quarck, initially, at 
least, appeared to support the idea of an independent Coburg. As time
(30)
passed, however, he became increasingly aware that pressurewould mount
on Coburg from its much larger and stronger neighbours wishing to
swallow up ’den fetten Bissen’ that Coburg represented with its rich
cultural inheritance and relatively good food .supply.^  Immediately
after the war, Coburg had a sound financial footing with income from
meat products, timber trade, agricultural produce, breweries and ass- •'
orted smaller industries like the porcelain works, as well as income
(7)generated by the theatre, the castle and its possessions*. Uncert­
ainty as to the size and nature of Allied compensation claims or 
reparations under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles did, however, 
undermine the confidence of those looking to a ’Freistaat Coburg’. A 
small, independent state like Coburg would be easy ’prey’ for the cen­
tral government as regards contributions to meeting Allied reparations’
demands, and it might, therefore, be in Coburg’s own long-term inter-
(8)ests to somehow ally with a larger state.
An obvious choice would have been to take up the old links with Gotha
and join the state of Thuringia. Meetings had been arranged from a
very early time to discuss the establishment of a union of Thuringian
(9)states into a ’Grossthueringen’. This itself proved to be something 
of a stumbling block, however, as regards serious negotiations between 
"Coburg and Thuringia, for whilst negotiations went on between the 
Thuringian states themselves on the question of a united ’Grossthuer­
ingen’, there was no easily identifiable body with which Coburg could 
negotiate terms of entry into such a union. A further difficulty
was that whilst it seemed likely that the majority of the socialists 
in the Coburg Assembly would be naturally inclined to the Thuringian
option, their most able member, Franz Klingler, had no such inclination.
(11)His preferences were for a union with Bavaria.
(31)
Union with Prussia was another of the options discussed in Coburg at
that time, although, as Juergen Erdmann writes, it is still a matter
of some conjecture as to how seriously advances were made to Prussia.
There is a belief that negotiations were taken up with Prussia for
purely tactical reasons in order to 1 enhancef the attractiveness of
Coburg by forcing the other two states involved, Bavaria and Thuringia,
(12)to act decisively before the Coburg 'jewel1 was lost to both of them. 
The main reason for this scepticism is that union with Prussia was not - 
a realistic proposition because of the self-evident difficulty of 
governing Coburg as part of a state from which it was totally detached, 
and with which it shared no common border. At that time, though, 
there did appear to be a good deal of early optimism when the 'Prussian 
connection’ was first mentioned because it did appeal to those conserv­
ative elements hoping for the quick revival of a strong, united Father-
(13)land under Prussian leadership. Knowing that the terms of the
Versailles Treaty meant considerable territorial losses for Prussia,
Heine, the Prussian Interior Minister, welcomed the opportunity to
talk to Dr. Ernst Fritsch, a representative from Coburg, in September
(14)1919 about a possible union. Heine's thinking was, however, more
along the lines of not only Coburg joining Prussia, but rather a union
of Thuringian states, as well, with Prussia. This also raises the
question, however, of how serious a suggestion it was on Heine's part,
for it seemed unlikely that Thuringia would ever agree to coming under
(15)the domination of Prussia. In hindsight, too, it must be noted
that the Reich government was highly unlikely to have allowed the re- 
emergence of a strong Prussia, which might constitute a serious chall­
enge to the establishment of a strong republic based in Berlin, and 
that it was equally as improbable that the Allies would accept Prussian 
expansion when her dominance in Germany had recently been curtailed
(32)
through the territorial adjustments enclosed in the terms of the Ver­
sailles Treaty. Prussia's interest in Coburg had, in fact, cooled 
noticeably when she discovered that Coburg was also negotiating with 
Bavaria over a possible union. Prussia thoughf.it .inadvisable at
that time to be linked with anyone appearing to have friendly relations 
with Bavaria because of the animosity growing between Bavaria and the
(17)Reich Government in Berlin at that time.
In the spring of 1916 there had been hunger riots in Munich and Bavar­
ians could not understand why such a rich agricultural region as theirs 
should have to endure severe shortages of food. Blame and resentment 
were directed solely at the central government in Berlin.
"Waehrend das industriearme Bayern bei den grossen 
Kriegsauftraegen staendig leer ausging, musste man 
tatenlos zusehen, wie der Reichszentralismus mit jedem 
Monat wuchs und das Land wirtschaftlich bis aufs 
letzte ausgepresst wurde."(18) ■
Relations were further strained in November 1918 when events in Bavaria
(19)proved to be a watershed in the ’German Revolution’. Fearing
invasion following the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Bavarians 
were desperately anxious for peace, and the'suspicion that Berlin con­
sciously rejected their concern and was in no hurry to seek peace, 
deepened the anger enough to allow Kurt Eisner, leader of the Inde­
pendent Socialists, to seize the opportunity and proclaim a republic in 
Bavaria. Eisner believed that as head of the Bavarian Republic he
could awaken a new spirit in Germany and that he could be a moderating
(21)influence on the victorious powers in peace negotiations.
Despite this ’revolutionary' background, there was, in Coburg, a sericis
(33)
(22)move towards Bavaria as early as November 1918. Following a meet­
ing between leading Coburg officials, representatives of the Coburg 
district and the W.S.C., the W.S.C. chairman was persuaded to support 
a move to stop other W.S.C. representatives, who were at that time in 
Weimar discussing the possibility of Coburg joining Thuringia, from 
giving any binding undertaking as regards Coburg1s future. A telegramme 
to this effect was sent to Weimar:
"Die Bevoelkerung Coburgs wird fast ausnahmslos Anschluss 
an die Republik Bayern wuenschen und zwar auf Grund der 
wirtschaftlichen Verhaeltnisse. Ich bitte bei eventueller 
Besprechung dieser Frage zunaechst abwartende Stellung 
einzunehmen, keine Zusage an Thueringer Republik."(23)
Leading members of the Coburg District Assembly like the prominent
S.P.D. figure, Franz Klingler, and Hans Schack from the centre. !Buer-
gerlichen' group lent their early support to the move towards Bavaria,
pointing out that there had never really been a happy relationship
between Coburg:and her former Thuringian partner, Gotha:the two peoples
were too dissimilar. As Franconians, the natural preference for the
Coburg people would be a union with other Franconian districts which
(24)did, in fact, lie within the Bavarian state.
Oskar Arnold, a leading representative of the centre ’Buergerlichen1 
party in the District Assembly and local-councillor with particular 
responsibilities for commerce, believed that there was, realistically, 
only one option open to Coburg. Uppermost in the minds of the people 
had to be an intense desire to preserve the cultural riches of the dis­
trict, and this was a concern which the Bavarian people and the Bavar­
ian government understood, and were supportive of, argued Arnold, but
(25)not so the people of Thuringia. Arnold referred to a leading
(34)
member of the Meiningen council who, on hearing of Coburg’s_anxiety 
over the future of the castle and the theatre, was reported to have 
said that places like the theatre should not be maintained, as it was 
only the upper class who attended it - and not out of any deep cultur­
al interest, but merely so that they might be seen amongst Coburg’s 
leading societal personalities. What clearly lent a certain cred­
ence to Arnold’s contention about the popular depth of concern for 
Coburg’s ’treasures’ was the fact that leading socialists, Franz 
Klingler and Reinhold Artmann, attended a meeting with various offic­
ials from the Bavarian government, including Dr. Hoffmann the ’prime
minister’, and sought assurances to guarantee the future of Coburg’s
(27) •’cultural' possessions. Discussion at this meeting centred around
a programme of ten points on which Coburg required certain'commitments
(28)if serious negotiations were to continue. All ten points were
(29)accepted by the Bavarian officials. Some four weeks before this 
meeting, the Coburg District Assembly had met, and the outcome was a ' 
clear indication of the direction most members hoped Coburg would . 
take. The influential Klingler summed up the mood:
’’Gewisse starke Stroemungen, die eine Bedeutung durch 
die Kriegsernaehrungs - verhaeltnisse erreichten, weisen 
nach Bayern. Es darf auch nicht verkannt werden, dass 
der fraenkische Einschlag unserer Bevoelkerung nach dem 
Sueden neigt, wozu noch kommt, dass betraechtliche Teile 
unserer Industrie, eng mit Bayern verknuepft sind." (30)
The following statement was issued after the meeting:
"Die Landesversarcmlung des Freistaates Coburg lehnt den 
vorgelelgten Entwurf eines. Gesetzes ueber den Zusammenscfci 
luss der thueringischen Staaten nicht ab, erklaert sich 
vielmehr bereit ... Regierungs - vertreter zu entsenden, 
urn gemeinsam mit den Vertretern der anderen thuering­
ischen Staaten ueber die Voraussetzungen zu beraten...
Sie ist aber die Meinung, dass diese Schicksalsfrage des 
Coburger Landes nicht ohne vorherige Befragung der
(35)
. Bevoelkerung entschieden werden. kann, und - 
ersucht die Staatsregierung, mit tunlichster Beschleunigung 
die Massnahmen zu treffen, die zur Vorbereitung und 
Durchfuehrung der Volksbefragung erforderlich sind."(31)
The assembly had not rejected the idea of a union with Thuringia, but
it had delayed any such decision which, it believed, should first go
to a referendum. In asking the people of Coburg to decide for thems-
selves what future course Coburg should take, all sides were keen to
impress on the people that they, the people, should take account of
Coburg's long term political and economic interests, and not allow
short-term issues like the food factor to disproportionately influence 
(32)their voting. Despite the calls, it seemed that the people were
looking eagerly to see which side could offer the best promises regard­
ing the guarantee of food supplies, or which side, at least, looked
(33)the better partner in this respect. Accepting that the 'Magen-
frage' was going to play a decisive role, the Coburg state ministry 
abandoned its calls on the people to take a broader perspective of the 
issues and sent a telegramme to the Bavarian government in Bamberg : 
asking for an assurance that if Coburg were to join Bavaria, then she 
would be admitted to the association dealing with the Bavarian food- 
production economy. An answer came on the following day from the 
'prime minister' himself, Dr. Hoffmann:
"Bestaetige, dass Coburg nach Anschluss an Bayern 
alsbald in bayerische Ernaehrungs - und Wirtschaft- 
sorganisation aufgenommen wird." (34)
On 30th October 1919 a proposal was laid before Coburg's District 
Assembly calling for a referendum to be held on Sunday, 30th November 
1919 in which the people of Coburg should answer 'yes' or 'no' to the 
question:
(36)
nob Coburg dqm Gemeinschaftsvertrag der thueringischen 
Staaten nebst Nachtrag beitreten soil."(35)
A ’no1 to the question would automatically be a vote in favour of join-
*ing Bavaria.
An ’eleventh hour’ attempt was made to win over the people of Coburg 
to the Thuringian option on the day before the referendum. The 'Cobu­
rger Volksblatt' published an article submitted by officials from
(361Thuringia giving assurances on Coburg's cultural heritage. The
article also promised that any subsequent plan for Thuringia to then
join Prussia would be preceded by a referendum in the Coburg district
to discover whether, under such circumstances, Coburg would then want
to leave the Thuringian union. Supporters of the Thuringian option in
the Coburg district challenged the idea that food supplies would be
guaranteed if Coburg were to join Bavaria. A recent incident was cited
where, during a period of rationing, three pounds of potatoes a week
were distributed to families in Munich, but not to people in Wuerzburg,
Nuernberg, Bamberg or any other urban areas outside the Bavarian capi-
(37)tal. Coburg would surely suffer the same fate.
The result of the referendum was a vote of 3,466 who said 'yes' -
almost twelve percent - and 26,102 who said 'no' - around eighty-eight
percent. On 11th March 1920, therefore, the 'Staatsvertrag' between
Coburg and Bavaria was accepted by the Bavarian District Assembly :
and on 30th April 1920 the German National Assembly passed the necess-
(38)ary law relating to the recognition of this treaty.
(37)
/
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CHAPTER 3.
SOCIALISM IN REICH AND COBURG.
•
Undoubtedly one of the prime factors in explaining what is seen by many 
commentators as the failure of the 1German Revolution1 in 1918, or, as 
Karl Dietrich Bracher prefers to call it - the ’unfinished revolution1 
was the relationship between the rival socialist groupings.^ A 
study of their origins and political outlook is, therefore, basic to 
an analysis of inter-war events in Germany.
It was in 1863 that Ferdinand Lassalle, a lawyer of Silesian-Jewish 
extraction, founded the first German working class party : "the General ' 
German Workers’ Union", and its aim was the establishment of a social­
ist society after the acquisition of political power by the working 
class. Some six ;years later, August Bebel, who had first been intro­
duced to socialism by Lasselle, but who later became identified with k
the grouping under the influence of Wilhelm Liebknect, founded the 
"Social Democratic Workers' Party". This was, in fact, a Marxist 
party affiliated to the Second International, and committed to the 
abolition of class domination, as well as the full economic and polit­
ical emancipation of the working class. The earliest divisions in the
Socialist camp were between the’Lassallians* and the emerging Marxists,
(2)or ’Eisenachers’.
At a meeting held in Gotha in 1875, however, the two groupings decided 
to merge to form the ’German Socialist Workers’ Party’ and drew up a 
programme which was a mixture of the ideas of both Lassalle and Marx, 
a package assessed by A.J.Ryder as unity:
(43)
"... reached at the expense of clarity, for the two , 
conceptions of socialism could not be reconciled."(3)
The party did, nevertheless, display a good deal of harmony, united
in its opposition to Bismarck's anti-socialist laws of 1878 and his
(4)ensuing programme of 'state socialism'. Under Bismarck all social­
ist activity was banned for some twelve years, apart from the appear-- 
ance of a handful of socialist representatives in the Reichstag. Over
i
a similar period, though, the party's popularity grew so that in 1890
it polled almost 1.5 million votes compared with around 300,000 votes
(5)in 1878. To many of the socialist leaders, the Bismarck persecut­
ion revealed the reactionary nature of the German government and so
served to vindicate Marx's views that the state was an instrument of 
class oppression, a view not shared by Lassalle.Revolutionary 
thinking was strengthened in the aftermath of the harsh Bismarck regime, 
and such were the demands for a more radical approach that, at the 
Party Congress in Erfurt in 1891, a new, much more Marxist programme 
was adopted, along with a new name : "Die Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Beutschlands" (S.P.D.). The 'Erfurt Programme' basically comprised 
two parts:
(a) long term objectives of the socialist transformation of 
society that was to follow the breakdown of capitalism.
(b) short term objectives to be striven for within the exist­
ing capitalist system; for example, votes for women* demo­
cratic government at all levels and proportional repre­
sentation.
The programme appeared, initially at least, to be a clever synthesis
(44)
of Marxist revolutionary objectives and moderate short-term aims
designed to appeal to all shades of socialist opinion.lt'was, however,
(7)as A.J.Ryder points out, based on two assumptions. Firstly, that 
the S.P.D. was capable of winning a majority in the Reichstag; but 
secondly, that if it did win a majority, it would be able to use its 
power to turn Germany into a parliamentary democracy. In fairness to 
the socialists, it should, however, be pointed out that when they did 
achieve such a majority they were let down not so much by their own 
indecision as by a virtual ’betrayal’ due to a last-minute reversal to 
a more familiar negative, ever-fearful-of-change-stance by the National 
Liberals who, as in the 1848 ’revolution’, blocked any significant
(Q)progress in proper democratisation. This occasion was in 1912 when
the socialists won 110 out of 397 seats in the Reichstag and received,
initially,tthe support of the National Liberals for the introduction
(9)of socialist reforms.
In the early twentieth century Eduard Bernstein, a journalist and 
friend of Engels, emerged to head what became known as the ’revision­
ist’ section of the socialists. Like Engels, Bernstein believed
that capitalism was not, as Marx had envisaged, likely to collapse in 
the socio-economic climate of that day. The masses were not becoming 
progressively poorer, economic crises were becoming less, not more 
severe, and the workers’ standard of living was rising not falling. 
Bernstein was therefore concerned with adopting socialist policies to 
the circumstances of that time.^^ This ’revisionist\ tendency 
within the socialist party was greatly strengthened from several 
quarters : firstly, the rising influence of the trade unions who were 
decidedly pragmatic and reformist in outlook; secondly, the rise within 
the S.'P.D. of party managers whose abilities lay in organisation and who,
by temperament and training, were averse to extremism - men like Ebert,
Noske and Scheidemann. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
working class itself was inherently patriotic, ever prone to the ral-
(12)lying cries to protect the Fatherland. The rise in popularity of
this reformist section within the socialist party predictably provoked
an opposing reaction from the Left where, under the leadership of Rosa
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the call was for the German working
class, reportedly the largest and best organised in Europe, to take the
lead in overthrowing capitalism.
"If the challenge to the party centre from the right was 
based on a re-appraisal of revolutionary theory in the 
light of the relative stability and prosperity of capi­
talist society, the challenge from the left was based on 
belief in a new period of crises marked by the Russian 
Revolution of 1905 and a deterioration in the international 
situation." (13) ' A
The ultimate weapon, in the eyes of the Left, was the mass strike.
Between these two ’wings’ of the party was the so called ’Marxist 
centre’ with people like Kautsky at the forefront. Kautsky believed 
in a policy of attrition, for capitalism was doomed but no one could 
predict exactly when or how it would collapse. Reforms would hasten 
the coming revolution, which for Kautsky:
"... need not necessarily be connected with violence and 
bloodshed. There have already been cases in world history 
in which the ruling classes were extremely sensible, or 
especially weak and cowardly so that they abdicated vol­
untarily in the face of compulsion. A social revolution 
need not be decided at one blow ... Revolutions are 
prepared in political and economic struggles lasting 
years." (14)
So despite its considerable standing in the early years of the twent­
ieth century, the German Socialist Party was, as many observers have
(46)
concluded, dogged by the growing divergence between its revolutionary 
belief and its reformist practice. The weakness was, in fact, ident­
ified at that time by the French socialist. Jaures, who offered this 
analysis of the S.P.D. during a policy debate .at the Amsterdam Congress 
of the Second International in 190A:
"You are a great and admirable party, but you still lack 
two essentials: revolutionary action and parliamentary 
action. You were granted universal suffrage from above, 
and your parliament is but half a parliament ...
Yours will be the only country in which the socialists 
would not be masters even if they were to obtain the 
majority in the Reichstag... You hide your weakness 
and importance by trying to dictate to everyone else."(15)
Jaures urged the S.P.D. to pay less attention to Marx and more to the 
practical problems of winning power in a non-parliamentary state.
A.J.Ryder offers a more modern interpretation which differs little . 
from Jaures’ early analysis:
"It was the tragedy of the German socialists that 
because of the exclusive nature of the German political 
system before the revolution, and because of their 
internal disunity, during and after the revolution, 
they were unable to gain power commensurate with their 
promise or potential.” (16)
During the Congress of the Second International held at Stuttgart in
1907 a resolution was passed outlining the socialist attitude towards
war. It was stated that in case of a threat of war, the working class
had a duty to do all it could to prevent an outbreak, using whatever
means seemed most effective. In the event of war breaking out, then
socialists would be obliged to strive for its speedy termination and
to work with all their power to use the political and economic crisis
(17)created by the war to hasten the downfall of capitalism. This
(47)
was a compromise resolution aimed at satisfying demands from the Far 
Left that any war, regardless of its causes, be met by a policy of 
military strike, and proposals from the right-wing of the party for a 
resolution limiting the duty of socialists confronted by the threat of 
war to just a moral protest. The final resolution proved vague enough 
to be acceptable to both sides, although events of 1914 were to prove 
that this was a solution in words only, rather thancone which carried 
the weight of a specific, recommended course of action.
Following the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at the end of 
June, 1914, and Austria’s declaration of war on Serbia in late July, 
Germany was soon plunged deep into war fever, as there was little 
doubt that the German Government would support Austria if there were 
any moves against that country in its clash with Serbia. Uppermost in 
the thoughts of many German politicians at that time was obviously the 
reaction of pro-Slav elements in Russia to Austria’s move.Martial law 
and press censorship were introduced by the Reich government in an 
obvious attempt to muzzle all anti-Austrian and anti-war utterances. 
Together with the government’s own tendentious statements,this made it . 
virtually impossible to obtain a clear, objective picture of the in­
ternational situation which was changing with alarming rapidity. The
S.P.D’s Scheidemann himself wrote that at that time:
”We all believed that Germany had been attacked - that
the French had poisoned German water supplies and.that ,
the French airmen had dropped bombs on Nuremberg and Fuerth."
Against such a highly charged background the S.P.D. became disunited 
in its attitude to war, so much so that at a meeting of the S.P.D. 
Parliamentary Party, only fourteen members were in favour of opposing
(48)
the voting of war credits whereas seventy-eight members were in favour, 
in a vain attempt to maintain some semblance of unity it was decided 
that the party should vote 'en.bloc' for the granting of credits, -but 
to accompany this with a statement explaining.how the S.P.D. under­
stood that Germany was threatened with invasion by Russian despotism
and that whilst the Party disclaimed all responsibility for the war,
(19)it would not desert the country in its hour of need.
The reported danger from Russia had very much the same influence in 
rallying the German Left behind its rulers as did the violation of 
Belgian neutrality in shaping British left-wing opinion towards the 
war. A war with Tsarist Russia was probably the one war which most 
German socialists felt to be broadly compatible with their obligations 
to the Second International:
"Fear of the Russian steamroller soon outweighed 
the scruples of German socialists about Austria's 
war guilt..." (20)
The other decisive factor at work in deciding whether or not the S.P.D 
should support the war effort was the possible, or indeed likely re­
action of the public, in_:particular, the supporters of the S.P.D., to 
any vetoing of war credits. In such an excited state of public opin­
ion it could possibly have been suicidal for the socialists to have 
blocked the war credits bill. In his comprehensive study of socialism 
in Germany at this time, A.J.Ryder points to comments of men like 
Gustav Noske, an S.P.D. member of the Reichstag, who told the Assembly
that, had his party not voted for the war credits, members would have
(21)been beaten to death in front of the Brandenburg Gate. Friedrich
Stampfer, one of the leading patriotic socialist journalists and later
(49)
chief.editor of the socialist national newspaper 'Vorwaerts', declared
that socialist voters in their millions would have turned on the S.P.D.
if the party had blocked the finances required to feed and equip their
(22)friends and relatives in the armed forces.
Despite the vote for war credits, left-wing discontent within the S.P.D,
grew as the war went on. This discontent culminated in the internal
conflict which broke out in the S.P.D. when eighteen members who had
voted against an emergency budget, which incorporated a war credits
bill, in March 1916, were formally deprived of their parliamentary
rights by the executive of the S.P.D. It was Hugo Haase in fact,
chairman of the party, including the parliamentary party, who had led
this 1 revolt’ with a scathing attack on Ebert's governmental policies.
As a result of the executive’s action against him and his supporters,
Haase formed a separate parliamentary group, the social democratic
(23)’Arbeitsgemeinschaft’. This grouping incorporated a wide range of
left-wing socialists whose common trait was opposition to war, but
which was itself sub-divided into pacifists, doctrinaire Marxists and 
(24)Spartacists. The ’Arbeitsgemeinschaft’ also provided the core for
the ’Unabhaengige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands’ (U.S.P.D.)
(25)which was formed at a conference held in Gotha in April 1917*
As the war continued and circumstances at home in Germany deteriorated 
- in particular the problem of food shortages - public support for the 
anti-war stance of ’U.S.P.D.' or Independent Socialists, grew. Its 
influence was especially strong in the huge metal workers' union, and 
subsequently with some of the W.S.Cs, yet it never quite gained enough 
support to eclipse the Majority Socialists. Admittedly within the 
Independents the revolutionary tendencies of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl
(50)
Liebknecht and their supporters could never be truly reconciled to the 
aspirations of men like Kautsky or Haase, yet the subsequent murders 
of Luxemburg and Liebknecht at the hands of the 'Freikorps', who came 
under the control of Ebert's Minister of War, Noske, did have a unify­
ing effect on the Independents in that these murders were regarded as 
an outrage which:
"... prefigured the end of the German Revolution and 
opened up a gulf between moderate and radical wings of 
the German labour movement vthat was to prove unbridge­
able throughout the years, of the Weimar Republic."(26)
I
To the Independents, these murders were irrefutable evidence of the 
most evil kind that Ebert and his supporters were:
"... bolstering up a rotten regime which ought to 
be allowed to collapse.1' (27)
The All-German Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils held in
Berlin in December 1918 confirmed that support from the councils for
the Independent Socialist did not extend much beyond supporting calls
for an end to the war. It was apparent during the Congress that there
seemed little interest in prolonging the life of the W.S.Cs. beyond
(28)the time needed to conduct new parliamentary elections. This
conflicting view of the role of the W.S.C. reflected one of the funda­
mental differences between the Majority and Independent Socialists 
during the 'Revolution'. The Majority Socialists saw the Councils as 
temporary bodies to maintain law and order until a parliamentary dem­
ocracy could be properly established. The Independents, however,
viewed the Councils as a much more permanent feature, and as a base on
(29)which to build genuinely democratic institutions in Germany. Many
(51)
Independents believed that the W.S.Cs. could and should,,: initiate the 
socialisation of the German economy without waiting for approval from 
any newly-elected National Assembly.
It was evident, however, where the support of the W.S.Cs. lay when the 
Congress voted by 400 votes to 50 to hold elections for a National 
Assembly on 19th January 1 919.^^ Despite passing a programme of 
rather radical reform for the army, the Congress then let the Majority 
Socialists ’off the hook’ by deciding that all such demands for reform 
were to be treated as a general directive, the implementation of which 
was to be left to the People’s Commissars under the supervision of the 
Executive Council. On its own, this offered some encouragement to the 
Independent Socialists who could expect to exercise some influence on 
the Executive, or Central Council, but then the final ’blow’ was del­
ivered when the Congress decided to vest any newly-elected central
council with powers of ’consultation’ only on the government, and not
(31)with exclusive responsibility for legislation. Consequently, the
Left boycotted the elections for the new central council and not one 
representative from the U.S.P.D. was elected to it. The Congress 
resolutions thus signalled the end of the Workers' and Soldiers’ 
Councils, and with them disappeared the final traces of ’Revolution’.
The development of socialism in Coburg followed very much the national 
pattern of events, with the 'Sozialdemokratische Partei fuer das 
Kerzogtum Coburg’ constituted in 1896. Initially this party was inde­
pendent of the S.P.D., but affiliation soon followed in 1906 and the
(32)'Ortsverein Coburg der S.P.D' was established. The economic and
social composition of the Coburg district, however, was not conducive 
to the emergence of any radical left-wing politics.Apart from farming
(52)
and forestry, employment was in a variety of small cottage industries
dotted around the Coburg district, with only eight companies in the area -
(3 3 )employing more than fifty people at that time. Combined with the
traditionalist sympathies of the people as a whole, this meant that 
there was little likelihood of the development of any militant, indust­
rial proletariat to support radical policies of the Left as was happen­
ing in the bigger northern cities.
The first notable success for the Coburg S.P.D. came in 1909 when their 
candidate, Friedrich Zietsch, won a second ballot against the well-
respected National-Liberal candidate, Hermann Quarck, in the Reichstag
f O/ \elections. Within three years of this victory, the 'Coburger Volks-
(35)blatt' had been founded. As had the S.P.D. in Berlin,so the Coburg
S.P.D. split into the Independent and the Majority.Socialists, but not 
until later during the days of the 'German Revolution'. The effect­
iveness of the Independent Socialists in Coburg was so insignificant 
that, as mentioned above, the fear of the authorities during those 
November days was not so much of the radical activities of elements in
/ oc \Coburg, but rather of socialists from Gotha. Apparently sharing
this concern about the 'extremists' from Gotha, the Coburg Majority
Socialists formed an alliance with the Centre Democrats with the common
aim of maintaining law and order against any outside influences during
(37)the days of uncertainty in November 1918.
During the early nineteen-twenties there was a good deal-of activity 
amongst the Coburg socialists, but none as aggressive as the party's 
paper, the 'Coburger Volksblatt' which, paradoxically, appeared rather 
out of step with Majority Socialist thinking at times. In reaction to 
the Kapp Putsch in March 1920, when a group of disgruntled army officers
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and Freikorps men led by von Luettwitz and Wolfgang Kapp tried to stage *
a right-wing coup in Berlin, the paper carried an article calling for
the arming of socialist groups and trade unions to protect the still
(38)weak Republic. This was probably the earliest call for action
which led to a crisis situation in the Coburg region in 1922/23 when
armed socialist groups clashed with right-wing elements in the fight
(39)to protect what the Left saw as the endangered Republic. There
was, in fact, a strong editorial reaction to the Kapp Putsch with head­
lines in the paper’s edition on 13th March 1920:
"Reaktionaerer Putschversuch!
Proletarier seid auf der Hut!" (40)
Two days later, the paper's front page carried a joint message from the 
President of the District Assembly, Erhard Kirchner, members of the 
Coburg 'Staatsregierung', and Ernst Fritsch. of the ’Staatsministeriumj 
calling on the people of Coburg to denounce the Putsch:
"Nur ein Wahnsinniger kann glauben, dass neue 
Putsche von irgend einer Seite den Wiederaufstieg 
und die Gesundung unseres schwer leidenden Volkes 
herbeifuehren koennten." (41)
In another article calling on the people to be in readiness for a gen­
eral strike, the paper insisted that this was a crucial moment in the 
brief history of the Republic.
"In aiesen Stunden soil die Frage entschieden werden :
Republik oder Monarchic." (42)
The belief reflected by the article was that Germany had passed its 
most difficult point on the road to recovery, and the Putschists knew
(54)
it. Production was increasing, the German Mark was strengthening all
the time, foreign policy with regard to the reparations problem was
«bearing fruit as the Allies came to realise that the Versailles 
’Gewaltfrieden’ could not be enforced to the letter. The Putschists 
wanted to prevent all this:
”Sie wollen nicht, dass das deutsche Volk gesundet, weil 
sie zu genau wissen, der Gesundungsprozess des Volkes 
bedeutet zu gleicher Zeit das Ende ihrer monarchistischen 
Traeume.”(A3)
The other fear raised by the paper was the possible reaction of the
Allies to the attempted Putsch in Berlin. No matter what line the
Allies took - if any - it would be the German people who would suffer,
and not the Generals and the Hohenzollerns, for the Allies would surely
not be sympathetic to calls for the revision of the harsh terms of the
Versailles Treaty, thus relieving the burden on the German people, if
right-wing elements were still seen to be strong in the Reich.The rich..
generals and higher echelons of society would always be able to feed
(44)themselves and their families.
Just days after the failure of Kapp came the article calling for the
arming of socialists and trade unions in order to protect the young
Republic. The paper called for a ’power factor’ which would be loyal
to the government, loyalty which was surely to be found amongst trade
(45)unionists and socialists. As the political and economic situation
in the Reich worsened during the early nineteen-twenties/ these armed 
groups grew and became increasingly bolder in their actions as they 
were increasingly faced with the alarming resurgence of nationalist 
groups. Having no confidence in the ’Einwohnerwehr’, which in most
(55)
regions in Bavaria actively supported these nationalist groups, the 
Coburg ’Arbeiterwehr*, as it became known, took matters increasingly 
into its own hands. The ’Arbeiterwehr’ was involved in breaking
up meetings of nationalist groups in the Coburg Kofbrauhaus, in organ­
ising and taking part in counter-marches during the Bismarck festival 
in 1920, and in providing bodyguards for members of the S.P.D. after a 
number of political assassinations of leading socialists like Kurt 
Eisner in Munich in 1919> Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in Berlin
in 1919, as well as the former Reich finance minister, Matthias Erz-
■ (47)berger, who was murdered in 1921, and Walter Rathenau’s murder in 1922.
Outside the I^ely ’political’ arena the Coburg socialists were also 
active in organising or supporting strikes for wage increases, lower 
taxes, and demonstrations against food shortages.^ ^  The most radical 
action at that time in Coburg was in response to a call for protest 
action against what socialists saw as the Bavarian Government’s failure 
to take any measures to counter the re-emergence of right-wing extrem­
ism as evident when the leader of the Bavarian Independent Socialists,
(4 9 )Gareis, was assassinated. A general strike was called by trade
unionists and socialists throughout the region, but nowhere was the
response as effective as in Coburg, where gas and electricity supplies
were cut o f f . S u c h  working class agitation continued in 1922 with
a number of strikes in Coburg. One of the more violent actions was in
February of that year during a rail strike when police actually took
over the railway depot arid became involved in clashes with strikers and
(51)their supporters.
The ugliest scenes in Coburg during that time were, however, to be wit­
nessed in the aftermath of Erzberger’s assassination a few months
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earlier in 1921. The Reich had taken immediate action to try to assert
its authority as concern started to spread because of similar challen-
(52)ges to its authority in other parts of the Republic. A Presidential
decree for the safeguarding of the Republic was declared at the end of
August but this had little effect, particularly in Bavaria, where the
Berlin Government once again found itself in serious conflict with that
state. The authorities in Munich fiercely resisted what they saw as
further encroachment on their authority by Central Government, which in.
turn was growing increasingly alarmed at Bavaria1s unwillingness to
move against the many overtly anti-republican groups which had found
safe refuge in that state, "a hotbed of right-wing extremism” as Karl
(53)Dietrich Bracher describes it. In an attempt to display their
concern at events, the Coburg socialists, both Majority and Independ­
ents, came together to try to organise a protest meeting on 3rd Septem­
ber 1921. The two leaders, Klingler for the Majority Socialists and 
Voye for the Independents, wrote a joint letter to the authorities 
informing them of their plans and seeking approval to stage the meeting 
on the Coburg Schlossplatz. In a reply, the Bavarian authorities 
warned the socialists that they were unwilling to allow any march 
through the town centre which might follow the meeting, and to ensure 
that this did not happen, the police would seal off with barricades all 
exits leading from the Schlossplatz to the town centre.Klingler was 
incensed at this, particularly after assurances had been given that 
the socialists would provide sufficient marshals to keep control of the 
crowd, and, according to a report from the state commissioner for the 
district, Ernst Fritsch, Klingler declared:
"Wir wehren uns dagegen, dass man uns verbietet durch 
die Strassen der Stadt zu gehen ... Wir lassen uns nicht 
verbieten, dass wir von einer Zusammenkunft nicht gehen
(57)
duerfen wie wir wollen ... Wir werden den Leuten auf 
dem Schlossplatz sagen, sie soliten ruhig nach Hause" 
gehen. Wir lassen uns aber nicht sagen, dass wir auf 
dem und dem Weg nach Hause gehen sollten.n(54)
Voye then warned the authorities that the appearance of police at the
meeting was much more likely to incite the crowd than any of the
speeches or actions of the socialist , leaders. The meeting did take
place on 3rd September, and armed police did appear in trucks to seal
(55)off exits from the Schlossplatz to the town centre. .. As Voye had 
predicted, panic broke out in the crowd and many rushed towards the 
barricades. During the ensuing chaos the police discharged two hand- 
grenades in an attempt to keep the crowd back. At the urgent request 
of the Mayor, the police were eventually withdrawn in an attempt to 
avoid worse trouble. As it was, though, some twenty civilians had 
already been injured and one actually died of his wounds. The
extent to which the Socialists themselves, could be blamed for this vio-< 
lent occurrence is debatable, for whilst they went ahead with the 
public gathering and refused to give assurances that an Unlawful1 
march through the town would not take place, this event was something 
more than protest action at the murder of Matthias Erzberger. The 
socialists were, in fact, following the tone set by Central Government 
in demonstrating both their loyalty to the Republic and their opposit­
ion to what they saw as Munichfs abuse of its emergency powers which, 
in direct contravention of the recent Presidential proclamation, were 
directed solely against the Left, whilst the extreme Right was left to 
flourish unhampered in its anti-republicanism.
Coburg was thus becoming rapidly enmeshed in the wrangles which seemed 
to dominate relations between Central Government in Berlin and the 
Bavarian authorities in Munich from those early days of 1 revolutionf
(58)
(57)when Bavaria took a significant step by proclaiming itself a Republic. 
The remarkable thing is the speed with which the conflict between 
Berlin and Munich changed from one between the near-separatist atti­
tudes of the left-wing leader in Bavaria, Kurt Eisner, and Ebert*s . 
Majority S.P.D. government, to the constitutional battles Berlin 
faced with a Bavarian leadership which was drifting rapidly to the 
right. '
The elections to the Bavarian Landtag in January 1919 were the first
indication of the swing away from Eisner*s Independent Socialists when
(58)they won only three seats. The results left no party with an out­
right majority, but the biggest was the grouping of centre-right part­
ies who had united to form the *Bayerische Volkspartei’ and won
(59)sixty-six seats. The Majority Socialists had sixty-one seats.
Eisner’s position was obviously untenable given these results, and he 
knew it. Ironically he was actually on his way to the Landtag to de­
liver his resignation speech when he was gunned down by Count Arco 
Valley, a right-wing nationalist.^^ A new wave of revolt swept 
through left-wing groups in Munich and a revolutionary Central Council 
was established which refused to allow a new, duly elected government 
under the leadership of Majority Socialist’s Johannes Hoffmann, to 
take office. The Central Council proclaimed the ’Bavarian Soviet
Republic’ and refused:
"any collaboration with the despicable Ebert-Scheidemann- 
Noske - Erzberger regime.” (62)
and enforced Hoffmann’s government into ’exile’ in Bamberg, to return 
to Munich some four weeks later once the Soviet had been ruthlessly 
suppressed by Reichswehr units supported by the Bavarian ’Freikorps.'
(59)
Hoffmann did not realise, though, that his days in office were also 
numbered:
"The experience with the Republic of Soviets had 
swept away whatever brief revolutionary thrill 
Bavarians might have experienced during the first 
days of their revolution in November. Popular 
opinion about revolutions now swung completely 
about ... The Bavarians could no longer have their 
king but ... they could curse the national govern­
ment as the seat of all evil and damn as ’Marxist1 
whatever did not suit their fancy.” (63)
Despite fairly widespread revulsion at Eisner’s assassination, isol­
ated support for the killing of someone Count Arco saw as a:
”... Bolshevik. He is a Jew, he-is not a German. He 
betrays the Fatherland..." (64)
(65)was to be found amongst such groups as the university students. 
Furthermore, such was the deep-rooted support for right-wing politics 
that within a matter of some ten months, the Right displayed obvious 
confidence in their ability to attract popular support by staging a 
’coup’ in Bavaria. Whilst Kapp’s Putsch attempt in Berlin failed, one 
in Munich was quite successful.
After a secret meeting between the head of the Munich police, Poehner, 
the leader of the ’Einwohnerwher’, Escherich, the District Commander 
of the Reichswehr, General von Moehl, and Gustav von Kahr, a leading 
right-wing politician, at which von Moehl was urged to take control 
in Bavaria, the General presented the S.P.Ds. Hoffmann with an ult­
imatum which led to the establishment of a right-wing government under 
(66)von Kahr. Within just seventeen months of the ’revolution’, then,
the first totally’buergerlich’ government in Germany had been formed
(60)
in Bavaria - a far cry from Eisner’s ’Bavarian Republic’.
"Bavaria was thenceforward ruled by a state government 
which had strong particularist leanings and a Right-wing 
bias quite out of sympathy with the policies pursued by 
the central government in Berlin. Bavaria thus became 
a natural centre for all those who were eager to get rid 
of the republican regime in Germany, and the Bavarian 
government turned a blind eye to the treason and conspiracy 
against the legal government in the Reich which were being 
planned on its doorstep." (67)
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CHAPTER A.
THE BIRTH OF THE RIGHT-WING BACKLASH AND THE EMERGENCE OF NAZISM 
IN COBURG, BAVARIA AND REICH.
Once a right-wing government had taken over in Munich, the ’battle* 
with Berlin took on a different complexion as the Bavarian Government, 
under von Kahr's leadership, sought to preserve its sovereignty against 
what it believed to be the encroachments of Berlin centralism. The 
target for Bavaria’s ’attack’ on the Berlin Government was Article 48 
of the Weimar Constitution which feave the President of the Reich the 
right:
"zur Wiederherstellung der oeffentlichen Sicherheit 
und Ordnung die noetigen Massnahmen zu treffen, 
erforderlichenfalls mit Hilfe der bewaffneten Macht 
einzuschreiten."(1)
Von Kahr’s cabinet rule generated an atmosphere of counter revolution 
in Bavaria which the Central Government attempted to combat by invok­
ing its emergency powers under Article 48, but with very little succ­
ess. Von Kahr was of the ’old school’ of Bismarckian civil servants 
and a resolute supporter of the old royal families in Bavaria, who 
would have welcomed a return to a monarchal form of government. The 
climate in Bavaria in the early nineteen-twenties was perfect for the
growth of the plethora of bodies describing themselves as ’volkisch’
(2)or ’vaterlandisch’. A host of well-known nationalist figures had
fled to Bavaria in the aftermath of the First World War, men like
General Ludendorff, Admiral Tirpitz, officers Goering and Roehm, the
(3)author Dietrich Eckart, and, of course, Hitler himself. Relations 
between Bavaria and Berlin deteriorated rapidly as the Bavarians
(67)
came to despise Berliners almost as much as their former enemies.
"Whoever voiced an attack on the Berliners as;did, 
for example, a certain Adolf Hitler, could be assured 
of loving protection in Munich."(4)
As mentioned above, the aftermath of Erzberger’s assassination had also
(5 )effected a sharp clash between Munich and Berlin. The Reich Chan­
cellor at that time was Josef Wirth, a left-wing Centrist who had
formed a coalition government in April 1921 after the crisis over the
(6)
reparations issue had brought down the previous government. . Wirth 
had presented a Presidential proclamation invoking Article 48 of the 
Weimar Constitution in an attempt to stem growing concern over right- 
wing attacks on the Republic. Von Kahr's government refused to ackr: 
nowledge the decree and allowed attacks on the Republic to continue, 
such as during a ceremony to commemorate the victory at Sedan in 
1870 during the Franco-Prussian war, when a leading figure in Bavaria 
and former army general bitterly attacked the Berlin Government as:
"the executors who are dispensing the profits they 
inherited from the world war..." (7)
and then publicly reviled the flag of the Republic with the charge 
that it contained:
"the yellow stripe of Jewry..."(8)
Von Kahr obviously overestimated the support he had in stubbornly 
refusing to acknowledge the Presidential proclamation and in urging 
Bavaria along its ’collision course’ with Berlin because the executive 
committee of the Bavarian Landtag refused to support him on this issue
(68)
and urged a compromise approach. Von Kahr refused, and without the
support he needed, was forced to resign in favour of the more moderate
(9)approach of Count Lerchenfeld. In an atmosphere of right-wing
resurgence, Count Lerschenfeld’s concilliatory.approach was soon att­
acked and discredited by the Right,and by November of the following 
year, 1923, he too had been forced to resign in favour of the right- 
wing Eugen von Knilling.
With this backdrop of right-wing resurgence, events in Coburg such as 
the "Blutsonnabend" of 3rd September in 1921 highlighted a crucial 
stage in political developments in CoburgP^ As well as causing 
socialists to have second thoughts about the wisdom of supporting the 
move to enter into union with Bavaria in the 1919 referendum, the - 
events of that Saturday in Coburg signalled the start of a move against 
the socialist - albeit mild form thereof - climate in Coburg. The 
fact that the Bavarian Government had been so involved in the decision 
to ban a march in Coburg, and in moving a substantial number of extra 
police into Coburg, signalled a determination to snuff out left-wing 
opposition where it existed within Bavaria*s borders. It was also
the signal for the resurgence of right-wing activity in Coburg itself.
In Coburg, as throughout the Reich, overt political activity on the 
side of right-wing parties had been subdued in the days immediately 
following the end of the First World War. It was initially amongst 
such groups as the many war verterans' associations and other para­
military bodies that anti-revolutionary and anti-republican sentiments 
were allowed to flourish unchecked. In Coburg, a ’Buergerwehr1, or 
civil guard, had been raised to maintain public order during those 
days of uncertainty in November 1918, and when Coburg joined Bavaria
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this body was superseded by the Coburg branch of the 'Einwohnerwehr’.
This organisation was controlled centrally from Munich with regional
outposts and was to be used to police political demonstrations and
strikes, and to perform security functions at»public buildings and
(12)businesses during periods of political agitation and unrest. In
this way Coburg was caught up in an early dispute between Bavaria and
the Reich Government in Berlin when, under pressure from the Allies,
Berlin called for the disarming and disbanding of all ’Einwohnerwehr’.
Although the Right argued that these bodies were essential to defend
citizens against 'Bolshevik armed bands1 trying to preach the message
of revolution from Russia,’Einwohnerwehr’ units had 'themselves already
been engaged in overtly political acts such as the establishment of
(13)von Kahr’s right-wing government m  Munich. . - When the order was
issued to disband the ’Einwohnerwehr’ Bavaria refused, and in an open
act of defiance even allowed the ’Einwohnerwehr’ to publicly organise
( )a ’Bavarian Shooting Match’ and declare it to be an annual event.
By the time the Bavarian ’Einwohnerwehr’ and thereby the Coburg regi­
ment too, had been disbanded in June 1921, numerous other organisations 
had emerged to more than compensate for its demise. Groups like the
’Bund Wiking’, ’Bund Bayern Hnd Reich’ and ’Stahlhelm’ all developed
(15)considerable support in Coburg during the early nineteen-twenties.
The ’Bund Wiking’ had emerged from the ’Brigade des Seeoffiziers
Hermann Ehrhardt’ which, apart from taking the lead in the abortive
Kapp Putsch, had also been involved with other ’Freikorps’ units in
the bloody suppression of the Bavarian Soviet. When.the ’National- •
sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei’(N.S.D.A.P.) was banned later
in November 1923 after the Hitler Putsch, many of the Coburg Nazis
joined the ’Bund Wiking’ which subsequently became the largest of the
(17)right-wing bodies.
(70)
Two other organisations were also active in Coburg at this time : the 
’Deutschvoelkischer Schutz - und Trutzbund’ and the 1Jungdeutsche 
Orden 1. The former group was responsible for organising amongst 
other events, the ’Third German Day’ in Coburg in October 1922 which 
proved to be something of a watershed in the resurgence of right-wing 
politics in Coburg and Bavaria, and which will be considered in detail 
later. The ’Jungdeutsche Orden’ displayed many traits similar'to those*
of the Nazis, particularly in its violent anti-semitisra, and was regu-
• . (18) larly involved in street brawls with socialist groups. In the
tense domestic atmosphere following the assassination of Rathenau in
June 1922 there was a particular incident when a group of Coburg
workers broke into a meeting of the 'Jungdeutsche Orden’ in a public
house and tried to seize a number of anti-republican papers. In the
ensuing fight knives and truncheons were produced and a considerable
(19)amount-of damage done. In the aftermath of Rathenau’s murder
attempts were made to ban groups like the 'Jungdeutsche Ordern’ and 
the ’Deutschvoelkischer Schutz-und Trutzbund’ but this simply had the 
effect of deepening the anti-semitism amongst right-wing,extremists. 
Rathenau was a Jew and his assassination was seen by Franz Schwede, 
one of the early ’Ortsgruppenleiter' of the Coburg N.S.D.A.P,as. being 
significant for future political developments in stirring up anti­
semitism.
"Das in seiner Machtstellung durch die Ermordung 
Rathenaus empfindlich getoffene Judentum schaeumt 
vor Wut Hass und erreicht im Juli 1922 das Verbot 
des DVST ..." (20)
In spite of the abdication of Carl Eduard, Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 
in 1918, the Duke was clearly not prepared to have his considerable 
political influence neutralised. He was at this time a leading patron
- (71)
of the Coburg 'Einwohnerwehr* and became a personal friend of Captain
Erhardt, occasionally participating in some of Ehrhardt's brigade's -
operations, and often acting as host to Ehrhardt in Coburg. The Duke
was also active in groups like 'Stahhelm* and*'Bund Wiking* lending
his considerable prestige and finances to the activity of such right- 
(21)wing groups. Carl Eduard even met Hitler in.1922 and thereafter
became an active supporter and patron of the Nazis, so much so that 
during the Chancellor crisis of November 1932 he offered to place at 
Hitler^ disposal:
"... jede vermittlertaetigkeit ... uneingeschraenkt." (22)
Of the right-wing political parties active in Coburg in the immediate
post-war years, only the 'Deutschnationale Volkspartei' (D.N.V.P.) had
any representation. In the Coburg District Assembly it had one repre-
(23)sentative. Despite this, the party did have something of a mouth­
piece in one of Coburg's three daily newspapers, the 'Coburger Zeitung'
which throughout 1919 had carried attacks on the Allies, primarily for
(24)their inability to guarantee food supplies to the German people.
The paper's nationalist feelings were nowhere more obvious than when it 
reported on the signing on 28th June 1919 of the Versatile Treaty.
The papers headline was:
"Der Vernichtungsfriede unterzeichnet." (2 5)
Increasingly the Versaille Treaty was to become the 'whipping boy* of 
the Right for the crises which were to beset Germany during the nine­
teen twenties. As Elisabeth Wiskemann points out:
"... to the Treaty of Versailles, the National Socialists
(72)
owe mainly gratitude for supplying them with 
admirable propagandists material..." (2.6)
The main aims of the Versailles Treaty would appear to have been : to
reduce Germany from the status of world power to that of European; to
take from Germany its territorial conquests; to destroy Germany as a
military power and make her pay for the devastation inflicted on other ' 
(27)countries. ' Although historians agree that the resurgence of nat­
ionalist extremism as embodied in Nazism cannot be blamed on any one 
factor alone, there is a good deal of consensus that the harsh terms 
of the Versailles Treaty did make it a useful 1 tool* which the nat­
ionalists used to great effect to whip up fever-pitch patriotism 
amongst the Germans during the nineteen-twenties. Psychologically
Article 231 of the Treaty, the so-called 'guilt clause' was of great 
significance in uniting all shades of opinion in Germany. The
Article stated:
"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany
accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for
causing all of the loss and damage to which the Allied 
and Associated Governments and their nationals have been 
subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them 
by the aggression of Germany and her allies."(30)
Certainly Versailles had so incensed many of the right wing officers
in the Reichswehr that Generals von Luettwitz arid Ludendorff had not
(31)been slow to lend their backing to the Kapp Putsch in March 1920.
Hitler, too, made full use of the Treaty in his attacks on the Repub­
lic:
"The political situation at the present moment is 
similar to that of 1917/1918. Germany is led, not 
by Germans, but by international parasites. They
(73)
have no wish to see a strong Germany; their masters 
in Paris, London and New York would-not allow it...
Germany can only achieve political power through the 
German military virtues... our rearmament will begin 
on the day we assume power." (32)
In a reference to the terms of the Versailles Treaty which reduced 
the strength of the Reichswehr to 100,000 men, Hitler said:
"Sensible people realise that we cannot guarantee our 
security with an army of 100,000 men." (33)
As previously mentioned, Bavaria was proving an extremely fertile 
ground for such right-wing beliefs, and during the nineteen-twenties 
the Bavarians became convinced of their joint mission to both save
Germany from international 'thuggery* and also from the 'Marxists'
(34) *in Berlin. The Reichswehr was easily drawn into the conflict
between Berlin and Munich, despite the efforts of General Hans von
Soeckt, Chief of the German Army Command, who, like General von Groener
/
in those early days of 'revolution' in 1918, believed that it was in
the long-term interests of the Army to uphold the authority of the
Republican government and thereby preserve the unity of the Reich -
(35)at least for the present. As early as the autumn of 1922, though,
it had become rather difficult to keep the Army in Bavaria distanced 
from some of the right-wing groups. Von Seeckt was told by General 
von Lossow, Commander of the Bavarian Division, that contacts with 
the numerous 'patriotic' organisations were absolutely necessary:
"... because over 51% of all available weapons 
are in their hands." (36)
Von Seeckt, consistent with the approach he took throughout his com­
mand from 1920 - 1926 reminded von Lossow that a soldier dare not
become the servant of a political party, and still less of armed
bands. Von Seeckt insisted that the Army was above politics,that its
duty was to serve the state as a permanent institution, remaining
outside party politics. He hoped that by keeping the Army politically
neutral, its prestige and influence could be raised to its former 
(3 7 )level. Throughout the nineteen-twenties the Army was so success­
ful in evading the constraints of the Versailles Treaty in respect of 
training and the use of modern weapons that later, when Hitler came 
to rebuild the German ’war machine’, he already had a solid basis on 
which to start.
The young officer corps, in particular, was to become increasingly
attracted to the Nazi propaganda as it became disenchanted and impat-
(79)ient at the apparent acceptance of the Republic by its superiors. w 
Some years later, in 1930, at the trial of two junior officers accused- 
of spreading Nazi propaganda amorist their colleagues, Hitler seized f
the opportunity to speak directly to the young officer corps which was. 
following the trial closely.^^ Hitler’s promises of the creation of 
a great army in which there would be great opportunity for career 
development, were to have a profound effect on his audience, and 
within a very short time General Schleicher was to have relinquished 
all idea of the Army’s political neutrality and brought the Reichswehr 
into the political arena.
In the early nineteen twenties however, Hitler was not just concentra­
ting on winning friends in the Army, but was enjoying more widespread 
success in Munich, luring crowds with his anti-semitic tirades, real­
ising that in times of crisis nothing had a greater effect on an 
audience than vehement attacks on others who were shown to be escaping
(75)
(42)the effects of that crisis. Hitler somehow ’trapped1 his audience
by using the misconception that the Jews knew of some secret way of
avoiding the economic misery that was hitting everyone else. The truth
was, of course, that the Jewish middle class,, like the doctors and the 
businessmen, who were the particular target of Hitler’s ravings, were 
suffering just as much as, if not more than other groups in German 
society. The German middle class as a whole was devastated by the 
rampant inflation which crippled the German economy at different times 
in the nineteen-twenties.
”It is no exaggeration to say that the inflation of 1923 
wiped out the savings of the middle class.” (43)
Gustav Streseman, who was appointed Chancellor when the Cuno govern­
ment collapsed in 1923 during the crisis over the occupation of the
Ruhr, declared in 1927 that:
”... the intellectual and productive middle class, which 
was traditionally the backbone of the country, has been 
paid for the utter sacrifice of itself to the state 
during the war by being deprived of all its p r o p e r t y  and by 
being proletarianised.” (4 4)
In allowing Hitler to carry on, unchecked, with his outrageous public 
incitements, the Bavarian government was positively encouraging his 
’rabble-rousing” tactics and lending weight to the picture of Bavaria 
as a safe haven for extremist, anti-republican elements. At a time 
when relations with Berlin were deteriorating rapidly, it would have 
been simple, and quite legal for the Bavarian government to have 
stamped out this dangerous nationalist trend at an early stage by 
deporting Hitler as an ’undesirable alien’. Under German law, an 
undesirable alien was one who constituted:
(76)
"... a danger to the internal or external peace, 
security and order of the state." (A5)
There was ample legal precedent for such action, yet the Bavarian 
Government, in whose province such powers lay, did nothing.
When on 1st May 1923 Hitler gathered some 5,000 followers for ’field 
exercises', arming them with weapons taken from the Reichswehr barr­
acks, the Bavarian Government intervened to halt the ’exercises’, but
took no further action against any of the participants or the organ- . 
(.47)lsers.
"That in the end this movement would threaten everything 
dear to Catholic Bavarian federalists and particularists, 
they were not able, or did not wish to see, even when 
Minister Schweyer declared to the Landtag that the Nat­
ional Socialists’ platform was politically questionable 
from the Bavarian point of view... It remains the historic 
guilt of the Knilling regime that, blinded by its hatred 
of social democracy and a centralised Reich, it nourished 
a demagogic movement which was infinitely more dangerous 
than the Social Democrats and a far greater centralising 
force than the Weimeir constitution." (48)
Events in Coburg at this time were also growing more tense each day.
Within socialist circles there was a rising disenchantment with
political developments in the region since Coburg had joined Bavaria
- and, consequently, a reawakening of ideas for a closer link with
Thuringia, or perhaps even a ’Franconian Republic’ independent of 
(Aq)Bavaria. There was, of course, a corresponding reaction from .
the nationalist groupings in Coburg and incidents were becoming more
frequent where opposing political groups clashed. A critical
stage was reached following the ban placed on several right-wing
organisations after the assassination of the Foreign Minister, Walther
(51)Rathenau. As mentioned above, the Bavarian Government, in effect
ignored such decrees from Central Government and allowed nationalist.;
(77)
groups like the ’Deutschvoelkische Schutz - und Trutzbund (D.V.S.T.)
(52)in Coburg to continue unhindered in its activities. This non­
outlawing of the D.V.S.T. was important for attracting the 1Third 
German Day1 celebrations to Coburg in October*1922. The Coburg branch
of the D.V.S.T. numbered 400, quite a sizeable number considering that
(53) 'nationally there were not many more than 140,000 members. , Consid­
ering what the ’Gauleiter' of the North Bavarian ’D.V.S.T1, Hans 
Dietrich, a Coburg teacher, had understood to be a lively nationalist 
spirit in Coburg together with the growing anti-semitism amongst some
groups, Dietrich believed he had a strong case for bringing the ’Third
(54)German Day’ to Coburg on 14th and 15th October 1922. .The programme 
of events for this occasion was to be broadly similar to other nat­
ionalist festivities; rallies, marches, bands, concerts, drama, lect­
ures, discussions and the like. Invitations were sent to nationalist
groups and individuals all over Germany, as well as to those in other
(55)German-speaking parts of central Europe. An invitation to attend
threfore naturally went to the National S^o^ilists in Munich, but this
was a deliberate political act on Dietrich’s part, so Juergen Erdmann 
(55)believes. The National Socialists, and particularly the para­
military S. A., had at that time already gained something of a notorious 
reputation for their behaviour on the streets. In the late summer of 
1922, whilst marching in formation behind flags, banners and bands
across the Munich ’Koenigsplatz' they became involved in ugly street
(57)fights with opposing groups. Hans Dietrich was disillusioned with.
the methods adopted by his own organisation, the D.V.S.T,., and could
see little political success coming from their endless public meetings,
parades and leafleting campaigns. He was much more impressed by the
S.A’s tactics in Munich and by the radical tone of Hitler's speeches
(58)and writings. .For Hitler the invitation presented a golden
(78)
opportunity to ’test’ his tactics for the first time outside Munich. 
From an early stage Hitler had realised how effective a device mass 
meetings and demonstrations were for securing support for an avow­
edly populist movement. .
"The essential purpose of such meetings was to create a 
sense of power, of belonging to a movement whose success 
was irresistable." (59) -
Hitler had, in the tactics which often accompanied these mass meetings 
and rallies, hit upon a psychological factor which was to prove immen­
sely important in the rise of Nazism:
"... that violence and terror have their own propaganda 
value and that the display of physical force attracts 
as many as it repels." (60)
No less important to Hitler was the press coverage he could win by 
using such ’terror tactics’, for he fully appreciated what influence 
newspapers had over the German public:
"Das war die Keimzelle der S.A : eine Bande von 
Raufbolden und Schlagetots, die ... durch ihre Radau - 
und Pruegelszenen das Versammlungspublikum beeindrucken 
und den Blaetterwald zum Rauschen bringen sollten."(61)
Hitler recognised that his ’Beherrschung der Strassen’ tactics were 
certain to attract the press publicity which he sought in:order to 
’preach’ his message to a much wider audience.
According to Juergen Erdmann’s figures, around 3,000 people had gath­
ered in Coburg up to Saturday, 14th October, rising to 4,000 on the 
(6.2)Sunday. They had, indeed, arrived not only from all over Germany
(79)
but also from Austria, Hungary and the Sudetenland to join JJazi ...del e-
/ go \gations from Berlin, Hannover and Stuttgart. Hitler’s arrival
was expected around mid-afternoon on the Saturday by special train 
from Munich, and estimates of the size of the .party accompanying him 
vary : Juergen Erdmann quotes an estimated 650 supporters, whereas 
Hitler himself put the figure at 800, with more joining the group from 
Saxony and Thuringia. In keeping with its young traditions, the
entire party was wearing swastika armbands and many were carrying an 
assortment of weapons such as sticks, clubs and rubber coshes.
The first incidents occurred even before the special train reached 
Coburg with its Nazi passengers. It stopped at the station in Nuern­
berg at the same time as an express train from Munich to Berlin, and 
amongst various passengers alighting were a number of Jews.In Hitlerf-s 
own words:
"Our train which was beflagged was not to the taste of some
Jews ... Schreck leapt into the midst of them and started
laying about him.” (66)
Juergen Erdmann, who derived his sources from Nuernberg police inform­
ation, and in particular from a report to the Bavarianlntericr Minister* 
makes no mention of physical violence, but rather of vicious anti- 
semi tic verbal abuse and the daubing of swastikas over the other tr^ aSr). 
On arrival at the Coburg station Hitler was welcomed by Hans Dietrich 
who informed Hitler of an agreement reached between the organisers of 
the occasion, the town authorities and other Coburg representatives, 
under the terms of which the Nazis were not to march through the town 
in closed ranks with flags and banners, behind a musical band,so as to 
eliminate any possible provocation of other groups.
(80)
Hitler could not accpet such conditions and promptly ordered the flags 
and the band to the front of the group. He held it to be a provo­
cation in that:
”... ihre Einhaltung haette ihn (Hitler) seiner 
entscheidenden Wirkungsmittel beraubt. Aber sie 
erwiesen sich insoern als Vorteilhaft als sie den 
Anlass zur Uebertretung und damit zu einer 
Massenpruegelei boten, in der die Hitlerischen 
Raufbolde Erfahrungen sammeln, -sich bewaehren und 
in uebrigen auch ausserbalb Muenchens demonstrieren 
konnten, dass sie kein *DebattierklubT waren."(69)
A counter demonstration had gathered outside the station but it was not 
until sometime later, when the Nazis were parading to where they were 
to be billeted for the evening that the worst incidents of violence 
occurred. HitlerTs description was that:
”... we gave them such a thrashing that in ten minutesT 
time the street was cleared. All our weapons came in 
useful: our musicians trumpets came out of the affray 
twisted and dented. The Reds were scattered, and fled 
in all directions." (70 )
During the welcoming ceremony held in the Coburg Hofbraeuhaus, which 
was attended by Carl Eduard and his wife, Hitler was able to introduce 
his passioned, fanatical, anti-semitic style of oratory to a public 
outside Munich. He insisted that it was not the economic plight of 
Germans that was lamentable, but rather their political and moral dis­
array. According to Hitler, the economic crisis was more a gift which
would be used to lift up the German peoples and bring them together
(7L )again on the soil of the Fatherland. Both during the meeting and
afterwards there were violent scenes around the town centre, which
continued right through the night, spreading to some of the outskirts 
(72 )of Coburg. On the Sunday, the main event was to have been a pro­
(81)
. ♦  Vcession up to the Coburg castle, but an hour before the offidibl
procession was to start, Hitler led his own followers on a march up
to the castle, attracting so many others that the official procession
(73)had to be cancelled. Once at the castle, Hitler presided over a
march-past by S.A. units, then gave a short speech before leading the
" rr / \singing of the ’Deutschlandlied’ and the return procession.
Sunday witnessed far fewer violent scenes, although a group of Nazis 
did gather outside the home of one of Coburgs leading Jewish business­
men, Abraham Friedmann, and shouted insults and threats against his 
life.^5) Although Friedmann was known to give financial support to 
the centrist Democratic Party, the Nazi mob accused him of paying left- 
wing extremists and Communists to disrupt the German Day events in the 
town. The closing ceremony of this ’Third German Day1 was held
also at the Coburg Rofbraeuhaus and at that meeting resolutions were 
adopted which were to be passed on to the Bavarian Government, and the 
governments of the other German states. They called for active re­
sistance to the ’war guilt lies’ and for the rejection of the Versa­
illes Treaty, at the same time casting a vote of no confidence in those
state governments which, by accepting the post-war settlement, were
(7 7)guilty of a breach of the constitution. 1 As Hitler’s supporters 
made their way back to the railway station to take the train back to 
Munich, outbreaks of applause from groups of Coburg citizens,who lined 
parts of the Nazis route to the station,were reported:
’’Zweifellos hatte das Auftreten und Wirken 
Hitlers nicht nur in ohnehin schon national 
eingestellten Kreisen Coburgs einen gewaltigen 
Eindruck hinterlassen." (7 8)
Hitler’s own comment was that:
(82)
"The bourgeoisie had realised their courage".(79)
'The final incident occurred at the railway station when the railmen 
refused to drive the special train back to Munich. Hitler immediately 
threatened them that his supporters would take hostages and then drive
the train back to Munich themselves, upon which the railmen lifted
their refusal and supplied the necessary personnel. Hitler’s assess­
ment of such tactics was:
"At that date it was indispensable to act without
hesitations. It was the beginning of a new era." (80)
The two centre/right newspapers in Coburg, the ’Coburger Zeitung’ and 
the ’Coburger Tageblatt’ reported more the cultural aspects of the 
’German Day’ and it was left to the socialist ’Coburger Volksblatt’ to 
pass judgement on the disorders of those two days:
"Coburg unter der Herrschaft Hitlers. Die Kapitulation 
der Staatsgewalt vor den Hitler - Gardisten." (81)
The general tone of the ’Coburger Volksblatt’ and other socialist 
newspapers in and around Bavaria was one of condemnation of the auth­
orities for allowing Hitler and his para-military S.A. to roam the 
streets of Coburg unchecked, and a condemnation of the Bavarian Govern­
ment for allowing such an extremist right-wing, anti-republican group
(82)like the N.S.D.A.P. to blossom freely in that state. The events
in Coburg were also debated in the Bavarian ’Landtag’ on 21st and 22nd 
November 1922 and it came to light during that debate that the Interior 
Ministry had, in fact, been expecting a serious incident sooner or 
•later involving Hitlers N.S.D.A.P. because the Nazis had been allowed
(83)
(83)too free a hand in their activities. The Bavarian S.P.D. accused
the state government in Munich of gross negligence, inconsistent app­
lication of laws and preferential treatment before the law for certain 
groups. Coburg S.P.D. representatives like Franz Klingler talked
of bitter disappointment at the way things were developing in Coburg
after the hopes raised and promises made with regard to Coburg’s future
(85)just two years ago when Coburg negotiated a union with Bavaria.
He reported on the resurgence of the ’Losloesung von Bayern* call -
(8fT\the call to ’quit* Bavaria. In attempting to answer S.P.D.charges
against the Bavarian Government, Dr. Schweyer of the Interior Ministry 
ultimately defended the N.S.D.A.P’s ’democratic1 right to hold meetings 
and its rights under the freedom of expression. The Government, he
stated, would only intervene when the N.S.D.A.P. overstepped legal
(87)limits. The incidents in Coburg were also reported to the ’Reich-
skommissar1 with special responsibilities for public order and this
served merely to worsen even further relations between Berlin and
(88)Munich. Juergen Erdmann cites an example of an internal memo
circulated within the Bavarian Interior Ministry asking for no more 
detail of events in Coburg to be supplied to the Reichskommissar than 
had been given in the Landtag debate. Although in the long run
more details were eventually supplied, the wrangle between Central 
Government and Munich over steps to protect the Republic continued 
unabated. From the writing of local N.S.D.A.P. supporters and from 
Hitler himself, it is quite clear how much importance was attached to 
participating in the German Day in Coburg as far as the future growth 
of the Nazi movement was concerned. Hitler went so far as to describe 
the occasion as the start of a new e r a . ^ ^  Werner Faber, who was to 
become one of the Nazi leaders in Coburg and, in fact, was to hold 
office as mayor in Coburg, attached the greatest importance for the
(84)
•f ■ r .»movement to Hitlers appearance in Coburg. >o
f,Den rechten Aufschwung nahm aber auch in Coburg die 
voelkische Bewegung erst dann, als unser Fuehrer Adolf 
Hitler gelegentlich der Coburger Tagung der Gemeinschaft 
Deutschvoelkischer Buende im Oktober 1922 mit seiner 
Muenchener S.A zum erstenmal die bayerische Landeshaupts- 
tadt verliess ... und dort mit dera in der Stadt noch 
herrschenden roter Strassenterror derart gruendlich 
aufraeumte, dass die Coburger Marxisten noch heute 
davon traeumen wenn sie Albdruecken haben.
Die Stelling, die unser Fuehrer Adolf Hitler in Coburg 
erobert hatte, wurde dann bis zum November 1923 von den 
alten Wehrverbaenden noch weiter ausgebaut ... , Dabei 
wuchs unter der tatkraeftigen Fuehrung unseres 
Parteigenossen Schwede ... der politische Einfluss 
der N.S.D.A.P. in unserer Stadt." (91)
Maximum propaganda value was extracted from those events in Coburg as
they became known as one of the landmarks in the * struggle1 during the
early years of the Nazi movement. The tenth anniversary of the German
Day in Coburg was celebrated in style, and special certificates were
(92)printed and presented to those who had been with Hitler in Coburg.
As Erdmann points out, it was essential for Hitler to manufacture as
quickly as possible the idea of some kind of long National Socialist
tradition to fit alongside the mythology of the much-valued, old
(93)Teutonic way of life which was central to Nazi philosophy. The
specially printed certificates, or attestations, were all part of this
tradition as, within the Nazi movement, they soon became known as one
of the highest honours the Party could bestow on its supporters. On
the occasion of that tenth anniversary of the German Day in Coburg,
(94)Hitler was made an honorary citizen of Coburg.
Within months of Hitler’s visit to Coburg, the Coburg branch of the
(9 5 )N.S.D.A.P. had been founded. Franz Schwede became ’Ortsgruppen- 
leiter’ in April of that year, and, totally committed to Hitler’s cause
(85)
he had, by September 1923, increased the membership of the local 
branch to six hundred.
(86)
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, CHAPTER
/
CRISES FACING THE REICH AND THE RIGHT’S OPPORTUNITY IN BAVARIA.
Inflation in Germany was already a considerable problem before the war 
ended. In 1914 one U.S. dollar was worth 4.20 German Marks, and by 
early 1920 it was worth 100 German Mar k s . ^  Additionally, at the end 
of the war the young Republic was left with war debts of around 150,000 
million Marks, the cost of financing Germany’s war effort, whereupon 
the crippling blow of the Versailles Treaty and Allied claims for rep­
arations to help repay the war debts incurred by the Allies which were
(2)estimated at over 30,000,000,000 pounds. The Treaty left undecided
the amount to be paid by Germany in damages, and this was the task laid
before the Inter-Allied Reparations Commission which met for the first
time in January 1920. By April 1921 this Commission had set Germany’s
(3)total reparations debt at 132 billion Marks. An ultimatum was sent
to the German Government, giving her six days in which to agree to
this claim. Initial reaction saw the resignation of the Fehrenbach
government in protest, but realising there was no alternative, the new
administration under Josef Wirth, former Finance Minister, accepted
(4)the Allied demands with the backing of the Reichstag. Within a
very short time, however, under the added burden of continued rapid
inflation, it was clear that Germany would default on the scheduled
reparations repayments. Germany was granted a moratorium on repayments
for January and February 1922 whilst her creditors met in Cannes to
(5)discuss the situation. Britain and France had never seen eye to eye 
on the question of the treatment of Germany after the war :Clemenceau, 
the French prime minister, had wanted the Rhineland to become an inde­
pendent state, the Saarland to have been annexed to France, and Danzig
given to Poland,.but he was restrained in his demands by Britain and
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America.^ Britain now favoured a more lenient approach to the rep­
arations question not least because, in the depths of a post war dep­
ression, she wanted her best pre-war customer, Germany, strong enough
(r7\to become a valuable trading partner again. Poincare, who came to 
power in France in January 1922, wanted to press French claims to the 
utmost. He was acutely suspicious of Germany and insisted that she
to)could pay, but did not want to. William Carr highlights the reas­
oning behind such suspicions by pointing out that successive Reich 
governments were reluctant to take the drastic yet necessary steps 
towards currency stabilisation for a number of selfish reasons. 
Firstly, Germany benefited from the crisis in the economy because 
inflation had reduced the national debt to somewhere in the region of 
2,000 million Marks by 1924, and secondly, were Germany to bring order 
to her stricken economy:
n... it could be argued that the stronger Germany became, the 
more she would be called upon to pay; conversely, the weaker 
she was, the more leniently she would be treated.” (9)
Sections of the German community undoubtedly profited also from the 
rampant inflation:
"Landowners paid off their mortgages in inflated currency. 
Industrialists, enjoying cheap facilities from the 
'Reichsbank' easily repaid loans and turned their inflated 
profits into permanent assets by expanding their plant."(10)
Yet despite any such avoidance tactics on the part of Germany, the 
Allies themselves were largely to blame for this situation in so far 
as they had failed to resolve the question of Inter-Allied war debts * 
at a much earlier stage. Edward Carr, in fact, notes that by not
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agreeing on a figure for reparations at the Paris-vPeace Conference in 
1919, the subsequent Treaty of Versailles proved unique in that, unlike 
all previous peace treaties in which the victorious side was claiming 
compensation, it failed to specify the exact extent of that compensat-
The Cannes Conference of January 1922 also failed to settle the question 
of reparations, as did another conference in Genoa in April of that 
same year. Then, with the added pressure, of an economic depression 
throughout Europe, combined with American demands for repayment of 
large sums loaned to the Allies, Poincare acted, against British pro­
tests, and sent French troops with Belgian support into the Ruhr on
(12)11th January 1923. It was an act calculated to force Germany into
facing its obligations as regards bringing her economy under control,
but should it not achieve this aim, then France would extract its own
(13)reparations by exploiting the Ruhr’s economic resources. The
German Government under the chancellorship of Wilhelm Cuno, and supp-
(14)ortec by Ebert, the President, immediately protested against this.
The Germans claimed that this was a violation of the Versailles Treaty
v.’hich required all Allied decisions to be unanimous, but as she did not
have the military means to defend herself, Germany declared a campaign
of passive resistance and a suspension of any further reparations re-
(15)payments while the occupation lasted. Germany was thus once again
united against a common enemy, and the policy of passive resistance 
spilled over into an almost undeclared war, with German workers refus­
ing to co-operate with the Franco-Belgian forces and acts of sabotage 
directed against key installations by German saboteurs.
Although the occupation proved to be of little economic benefit to the 
French, it was the ’last straw' for a German economy verging on bank­
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ruptcy. Having lost large areas of Upper Silesia in the post-war sett­
lement, the Ruhr accounted for eighty percent of Germany’s steel and
(17)iron production, and over eighty percent of her coal production.
To cut off these resources, as the French did, and for the German
m
Government to even attempt to continue paying the wages of the workers
and officials on strike in the Ruhr, was a burden the economy could
not bear. The German currency collapsed as the exchange rate with the
dollar went from 160,000 Marks at the beginning of July 1923 to one
(18)million Marks by August 1923. Bankrupt businesses, food shortages
and unemployment were all consequences of the economic catastrophe as
it ravaged the middle and working classes, reducing the purchasing
(19)power of wages to virtually nothing. The crisis of 1923 and the
world-wide depression some six years later were to undermine the found­
ations of German society as never before, and right-wing agitators were 
to reap the profits of this catastrophe:
"The violence of Hitlerk denunciations of the corrupt,
Jew-ridden system which had allowed all this to happen, 
the bitterness of his attacks on the Versailles 
settlement and on the Republican government which had 
accepted it, found an echo in the misery and despair 
of large classes of the German nation.” (20)
Clearly the situation could not continue like this. The Cuno Govern­
ment fell and was replaced by a coalition headed by Gustav Stresemann,
(2 1)leader of the ’Deutsche Volkspartei’ (D.V.P.). Stresemann was
quick to realise the disastrous effect that the policy of passive re­
sistance was having on Germany, particularly after warnings from ind­
ustrialists that economic resources were strained to breaking point, 
and he therefore took the bold step of calling an end to passive re­
sistance unconditionally and declaring Germany’s willingness to start
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(22)reparations repayments again. Although this decision was support­
ed by all parties in Stresemann’s coalition government, (S.P.D.,
Centre parties, Democrats and D.V.P) it did.spark off renewed agitat­
ion amongst nationalist extremists and a resurgence of the now ever­
present conflict between the anti-republican state government in 
Munich and Central Government. Crucially, the attitude of the Army in 
Bavaria was, unlike military units in the rest of the Reich, and con­
trary to von Seeckt’s wishes, very much supportive of the Munich 
(23)Government. Captain Roehm of the Army District Command in Munich
had openly stated in a memorandum dated 13th August 1922 that:
"If everything accomplished thus far in Bavaria, Germany’s 
last bastion, is not to be destroyed, an open break with 
Berlin must be made." (24)’
Roehm believed that the Army had to intervene in the political arena 
if it wanted to create the sort of state which would restore Germany’s 
prestige and, under his influence, Major General Ritter von Epp came 
to lend open Army support to Hitler's growing National Socialist move­
ment:
"The military leadership of Bavaria saw in the N.S.D.A.P 
programme welcome support for its own plans insofar as 
the programme called for opposition to Versailles and 
for the creation of a large national army." (25)
In protest at the ending of passive resistance, the Bavarian govern­
ment under Eugen von Knilling declared a state of emergency and
(Of.)appointed former ’prime minister’, vor. Kahr, state commissioner.
The situation deteriorated for Stresemann, who was anxious to avoid a 
major conflict with Bavaria at all costs, when General von Lossow,
(98)
Army Commandeer in Bavaria, was relieved of his duties by Otto Gessler,
Reich Minister of War, for refusing to act against the N.S.D.A.P’s
newspaper "Voelkischer Beobachter". The paper had printed an article
attacking the Berlin Government and carried insulting remarks about
• (27)Gessler himself and General von Seeckt. In a further act of open
defiance, however, von Lossow was promptly reinstated by von Kahr who
then ordered all soldiers in Bavaria to take their orders from the ; ■
(28)Bavarian Government. - .
Throughout these months Hitler had been encouraging the growing dis- -
order by adopting a popular form of agitation, that of attacking the
Berlin Government for betraying the national resistance to the French,
and for allowing the domestic economic situation to deteriorate so far
as to bring hunger and poverty on many sections of the German commun-
(29)ity. When the state governments of Saxony and Thuringia (both of
which bordered on Bavaria) had been broadened to bring the Communists 
into power as partners of the Socialists, Hitler saw this as the per­
fect opportunity for the Bavarian Government to take action to suppress 
this threat’ of a left-wing revolution by marching into these areasV 
Hitler firmly believed that such action would command widespread sup­
port, and, more privately, that the road to Berlin would then be
(31)open.
Hitler was pre-empted, however, by Stresemann - albeit for different 
motives. Even before he came to power, Stresemann believed that for 
Germany to re-negotiate1its position internationally, the Government 
would need to display tight control over the domestic situation in
order to prove to the Allies that it was in a position to make decis-
(32)ions and implement them. The fear was that the worsening re­
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lations between Bavaria and Berlin in the autumn of 1923 might well be 
regarded as a serious threat of civil disorder which would merely lead 
to the French tightening their grip on the Rhineland and the Ruhr, as 
well as making the Allies generally less willing to grant any concess-
Stresemann was anxious not to let the situation in Bavaria deterion
that he had the ’national interest’ very much at heart, he would have
Alarmed by events in Bavaria, and the mounting evidence of collusion 
between the Reichswehr and the extreme right-wing groups in that state, 
Socialist-Communist governments were formed in Saxony and Thuringia, 
and ’Red militias’ were established to ’protect the Republic’. Incre­
asingly harsh criticism was directed by the governments of these two 
states at the growing influence of reactionary tendencies in the
Berlin Government which was standing idly by in the face of overt
(3fi)right-wing challenges to its authority. In an act of rather
doubtful legality, Stresemann ordered the Reichswehr into Saxony and
(37)Thuringia at the end of October 1923 to have both governments deposed. 
The commander of the Army, von Seeckt, noticeably reacted much more
swiftly to this situation, and with more rigour, than to the instances
of right-wing disorder, as the Army acted with unmistakable firmness
and effectiveness in removing the Saxon and Thuringian Governments from 
(38 vpower. Whilst Stresemann lost the support of the S.P.D. in his
coalition who resigned in protest at his action, he was still able to 
form a new government. More importantly for his personal aims,though, 
his action had found distinct favour with the more moderate nationalist, 
elements in Bavaria, as von Kahr and von Lossow now noticeably wavered
ions to such an unstable regime (33) It was for this reason that
(34)ate further. He had decided that in order to reassure the Right
to strike a blow at the Left, and this he did in the autumn of
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in their opposition to Berlin, especially on receipt of a report from
their colleague, Colonel Seisser, on the atmosphere in Berlin at the
(3 9 )beginning of November 1923. On November 6th von Kahr called a
meeting with his two co]leagues, von Lossow and Seisser, and represent­
atives of patriotic organisations to assess the situation and the 
chances of taking effective action against Berlin in the light of the 
unhopeful report from Seisser. Fearing that a delay on any action
would be called by von Kahr, Hitler, who had been excluded from the 
meeting, decided that immediate action had to be taken. After comm­
itting himself so openly to a march on Berlin, and after whipping up 
such a pitch of expectation amongst his supporters^itler feared that
to delay might well lead to the collapse of the Nazi Party and discredit 
(41)him totally. Hitler therefore decided that the only way to have .
von Kahr, Seisser and von Lossow do as he wished was to present them
• (42)with a ’fait accompli’. This he attempted on 8th November 1923.
A ’golden’ opportunity presented itself on that evening as a ’patriot­
ic’ demonstration of support for the von Kahr regime was held in the 
crowded main room of the ’Buergerbraeukeller’, attended by most of the 
leading figures in Munich politics and society. Supported by Goering 
with a group of armed ’brownshirts’ or S.A, Hitler dramatically dis­
rupted the meeting firing a gunshot into the ceiling and leaping on
to the speakers’ platform to declare the beginning of the ’National 
(43)Revolution’. What followed was a series of ill-organised and
unco-ordinated attempts by Hitler’s followers to establish some sort
of control in Munich. Despite all the talk of putsch, overthrow and
the like, it was fairly evident that none of the 'rebel’leaders had
thought through to the end the practical problems of staging such a
(44)coup. There was no attempt to occupy such obviously key positions
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as the police headquarters, the telephone exchange, or the railway
station, and von Kahr, von Lossow and other leading cabinet ministers
were allowed to make themselves scarce, some escaping to Regensburg to
(45)temporarily establish a Bavarian government. By the morning of
November 9th it seemed clear that the putsch attempt had failed : von 
Kahr issued a declaration denouncing the promises extorted from him at 
gunpoint on the previous evening and del/ckred the Nazi Party and the 
’Kampfbund’ illegal; von Seeckt telegraphed from Berlin that if the 
Army in Bavaria did not suppress the putsch, then he would do it him­
self with other Reichswehr units, and he ordered reinforcements to be 
sent into Munich from outlying areas; and, finally, Crown. Prince 
Rupprecht, whom it was intended to reinstate as monarch, recommended 
that the putsch be crushed at all costs. The putsch did, in fact,
finally collapse at the ’Feldherrnhalle’ in the centre of Munich on 
the afternoon of November 9th. Some two or three thousand National 
Socialists and ’Kampfbund’ supporters led by Hitler, Goering and Lude-
ndorff marched through Munich only to find their way forward blocked
(47)just before the ’Feldherrnhalle’ by a cordon of armed police. It 
was never clear who fired the first shot but shooting did break out,
.and reports varied from between fifteen and twenty people killed. It 
was an ignominious' end to the coup as'the marchers scattered wildly, y 
Hitler himself being bundled into a nearby car and driven off.into • 
hiding, only to be arrested two days later at a .friend’s house.
Considering the serious tactical blunders and the more personal loss of 
face, with Hitler being one of the first to dive for cover when the 
firing started, (dislocating his shoulder in the process) and leaving 
the dead, the wounded and the rest of his supporters to fend for them­
selves, Hitler’s political recovery was all the more remarkable:
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"Never was Hitlers political ability more clearly 
shown than in the way he recovered from this set- . - 
back. For the man who, on 9th November 1923, /
appeared broken and finished as a political leader - 
and had himself believed this - succeeded by April 1924 
in making himself one of the most-talked-of figures 
in'Germany, and turned his trial for treason into a 
political triumph." (48)
The significance of the trial for Hitlers future cannot really'be
? r/orunderestimated, for not only were the reporters from most of the bigg­
er German newspapers there, but there was also a large group of foreign
(49)correspondents present. From the very start of the trial Hitler's
objective was to turn the tables and put the chief witnesses for the
prosecution - von Kahr, von Lossow and Seisser - on trial before the
whole German n a t i o n . U n l i k e  the activists in the Kapp putsch,
Hitler made no apology for his attempted coup, but instead attacked von
Kahr and his colleagues for refusing to support it,accusing them of.
therefore being responsible for its failure. Hitler spelt out at some
length his programme and the political intentions which had motivated
his putsch attempt. His non-apologetic defence speeches and his
tirades against the sytem of the "November criminals", and the
"slaves of the dictate of Versailles" proved a highly effective way of
(51)appealing to nationalist opinion throughout Germany. At the same
time, Hitler also attempted to take up strong ties with the Army lead­
ership by exonerating the Reichswehr and apportioning blame for Germ­
any's problems amongst von Lossow, von Kahr and the 'system' of the
(52)democratic Republic generally. It was one of the features of the
trial that Hitler was allowed, with little rebuke from the judges, to 
engage in these long political speeches, and that, in the end, having 
actually been found guilty of high treason, was given the minimum sent­
ence possible of five years which, the President of the Court then
pointed out, was likely to be reduced for good conduct. The President 
then added that Hitler would probably receive a full pardon:
"Such were the penalties of high treason in a state 
where disloyalty to the regime was the*surest 
recommendation to mercy." (53)
Similarly, by so skillfully implicating von Kahr, von Lossow and 
Seisser in the treasonable plotting, Hitler caused great embarrasment 
to the court by highlighting the deep involvement, prior to' the events 
at the 'Feldherrnhalle', of high public officials and political lead­
ers, and he thereby ensured more lenient treatment of himself by the
(54)judges, who were themselves by no means too averse to Hitler's ideas. 
Even the state prosecutor, when summing up, prefaced his plea with
(55)a tribute to the 'nobility* of Hitler's cause. Some years after
the trial Hitlers own assessment of the putsch was:
"I have never said that our march to the Feldherrnhalle 
was a 'faux pas'. At the time it was the only form of 
protest we could make." (56)
Hitler claimed, however, that he did not:
"... for a moment conceive of coming to power.with the
help of the Generals or by means of a putsch." (57)
Karl Dietrich Bracher believes that the lasting significance of the 
abortive putsch was that it had made it patently clear to Hitler that 
a direct attack on the existing order would never succeed.
"Even in a critical year like 1923, the dominant forces
in the state, and even in the army, had not allowed them-
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selves to be taken by surprise... resistance 
stretching from the democratic parties to the 
trade unions had proved too strong to be over­
come by a 'Putsch1; finally, the very attachment 
to authority displayed by the middle class and 
the civil service which gave the Weimar democracy 
itself so much trouble was a serious obstacle to 
any attempt at a 'coup d'etat'. " (58)*
Support for law and order have always been, so Bracher argues, part of 
the traditional German authoritarian state, and in just such an atmos­
phere not only did Hitler's putsch flounder, but also the Kapp
(59)Putsch in the same manner, and before that, the revolution of 1918.
(105)
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CHAPTER 6.
COBURG AND REICH POST PUTSCH.
Whilst these years immediately following Hitler’s putsch Wv.re relat­
ively lean ones for the N.S.D.A.P in terms of electoral successs, it 
was the many other ’voelkisch’ organisations which played an important 
role in promoting extreme nationalist ideals which the National Soc­
ialists shared.^ - Amongst a variety of such groups active in the 
Coburg area, of particular importance in arranging meetings, talks and 
festivals and rallies all deeply infected with...
”... that exalted nationalist extremism which permeated 
Germany ever since 1918/19". (2)
were groups like the 'Deutschvoelkische Schutz- und Trutzbund*(D.V.
S.T.) and the ’Jungueutsche Orden’ who, between them, organised many
(3)celebrations which evoked that deep patriotic, nationalist spirit:
”... born.out of the disappointments of the First 
World War and the Treaty of Versailles..." (4)
- a spirit which ...
"... helped to magnify the appeal of a warped ideology: 
the passionate anti-Liberalism ... the avoidance of pol­
itical realism by creating a dream world of folk idylls... 
the transformation of the experience of the First World 
War into a rebirth of the German people." (5)
Anti-semitism, too, was a feeling kindled during some of these celeb­
rations, as during the inaugural speech at Coburg’s Midsummer festival
(110)
?ih 1923
"Im Innern des Volkes aber wuetet der Verrat ... und 
zwischen all dem Wust und Stunk schleicht hohngrinsend 
der Hebraeer, der schmutziger Ost'galizer als geheime 
treibende Kraft." (6)
The ’Fuehrerprinzip’, too, was commended to the Coburg people by none 
other than Goebbels on the occasion of the 1927 Midsummer festival:
"Was einzig Deutschland noch retten kann ist die Diktatur 
des nationalen Willens und der Entschlossenheit. Unsere 
Aufgabe ist,' dem Diktator, wenn er kommt, ein Volk zu 
geben, das reif fuer ihn ist." (7)
This was an idea which had already some notable support in Coburg, 
such as ’Staatsrat’ Quarck who, at a Bismarck commemorative cele­
bration remarked:
"Vielleicht weilt der erwartete Fuehrer schon unter 
uns..." (8)
The ’Coburger Zeitung’ reported such events enthusiastically and gave 
fully-detailed accounts of gatherings like the "Deutsche Tag des Jung 
deutschen Ordens", trying to capture in print the evocative national­
istic atmosphere highlighted by a ’tableau vivant’ depicting Germany’ 
fall and rise:
"Im Hintergrund erhoeht Germania, eine Jungfrau mit 
herabwallendem blonden Haar; von links und rechts 
draengt sich Jungdeutschland hinzu, die Haende • - 
hoffnungsvoll erhebend; ein junger Mann blickt trauernd 
auf sein'zerbrochenes Schwert; im Vordergrund erhebt sich 
eine Rheintochter aus den Fluten des Rheins, eine Krone 
mit beiden Haenden erhebend." (9)
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Another group instrumental in upholding and, indeed, propagating'these 
extreme nationalistic opinions was the student organisation known as 
*Landsmannschaften". Elizabeth Wiskemann traces the development of 
German student corporations back to the early.days when the earliest 
universities had been founded. With a somewhat ill-defined status
some students started to organise themselves into societies which be­
came known as "Landsmannschaften". Despite original aims of a united 
liberal Germany, Wiskemann claims that during the Bismarck era partic­
ularly :
"Now that Liberalism had gone to the wall... their 
nationalism became increasingly extravagant. They were 
all "Gross-deutsch" that is, they desired to incorpor­
ate in Germany not only the Germans of Austria and 
Switzerland, but also such "Nordic races" as the Dutch 
and the Flemings and perhaps the Scandinavians."(11)
With renewed vigour these organisations reappeared in the Weimar Re­
public.
"... the traditionalist , socially exclusive structure 
of higher education, which kept large segments of the 
population from institutions of higher learning, helped 
conserve reactionary organisations or favoured radical 
anti-democratic tendencies among students. Professors 
and students felt themselves the victims of the social 
upheavals of the time, and their status and prestige 
threatened'by democratic ideas of government and society'.' (12)
Coburg itself was, and still is, of particular significance to the
'Deutsche Landsmannschafter' because for over one hundred years' it
(13)has hosted the annual congress of the 'Landsmannschaften'. Pass­
ages from some of the main speeches during the 1929 congress clearly 
indicate why National Socialism attracted so much support from this 
group.
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•it"Das Bewusstsein muss allgemem werden, dass deutsches
Wesen herrschen muss in deutschem Volke.
/
Das Deutschtum ist ein Kulturbringer. Wir verneinen 
fuer das deutsche.Volk eine Weltanschauung, die micht 
aus deutschem Blut erwaechst." (1A)
Anti-semitism was, as will be seen later, to be a crucial factor in the 
critical year of 1925 in Coburg, but one of the earliest occasions on 
which it was dragged blatantly into the Coburg political arena was in 
the Landtag elections on 6th April 1924. As part of its manifesto, 
the 'Voelkische Block1, which was an alliance of various right-wing 
nationalist groupings, boldly announced part of its political programme 
in the 'Coburger Zeitung'.
"Angesichts der Rassenersetzung und - vermischung 
treten wir ein fuer Volks-und Rassenschutz, Auss- 
chliessung der Juden von alien Staatsbuergerrechten."(15)
The outcome of the elections in Coburg was highly significant especial­
ly in the eyes of National Socialist commentators, whereby the "Voelk- 
ische Block" won approximately fifty-three percent of the vote.
"Der Ausgaing der Landtagswahl vom 6.4.1924 zeigte aber, 
dass die Kraft des volkischen Gedankens durch den Verrat 
vom 9.11.1923 hier in Coburg wenigstens noch keineswegs 
gebrochen war (16)... Coburg ist also die deutsche Stadt 
gewesen, in der zum estenmal der voelkische Gedanke die 
ueberwiegende Mehrheit der Buergerschaft durchdrungen 
hatte." (17)
Despite this breakthrough, only a month later at the Reichstag elections 
the "Voelkische Block" vote fell back to forty-three percent and suff­
ered a further reduction to twenty percent in the December elections.
In elections held simultaneously for the Coburg "Stadtrat" on 7th
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December, the "Voelkische Block" polled barely twelve percent of the 
(18)vote. The reason was, according tovFaber, one of the leading
Coburg Nazis, quite simple,
•
"Der Mangel einer einheitlichen, zielbewussten und klaren 
politischen Fuehrung der voelkischen Bewegung durch eine 
ueberragende Fuehrer - persoenlichkeit machte sich aber 
waehrend der Festungshaft Adolf Hitlers schliesslich 
doch bemerkbar." (19)
Clearly there could have been some truth in this, certainly as regards 
the National Socialist party, yet it would appear more like a piece of 
National Socialist opportunism in furthering certain of the party’s 
aims, and in this case, the "Fuehreprinzip". For it must be rememb­
ered that this was the start of a period of relative prosperity for 
many Germans as stability returned to the economy and to Germany’s 
international relations. Therefore ,any attempts to undermine the
stability of the period - such as the Hitler putsch - could not comm­
and much popularity with the German people.
The issue of the leadership of the National Socialists was clearly a 
key.point in Hitler’s attempt to rebuild the party after his release 
from Landsberg, and his efforts to establish absolute control over the 
party ran parallel to the attempts to subordinate other "voelkische" 
groups to the Nazis. This might better explain Faber's point about 
the leadership of the 'voelkische' groups and also his rather taunting, 
sarcastic description of the; performance of the "Deutschnationalen" 
in the Landtag elections in 1924 when they polled just twelve percent 
of the vote. They suddenly became "auch voelkisch" and attached the
moving description of "heimattreu'e Coburger" to their name, says Faber
.. . . (21) dismissively.
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••t *S-Faber's attack on other right-wing groups is perhaps better understood
in the context of Hitler’s view that it was the National Socialist
movement alone which could draw together the "hodge-podge of ideas"
contained in the proliferation of "voelkisch" groups and change mere
(22)ideas into political power."
"As Hitler’s grip on the party tightened he began to 
reject the idea of co-operation with other voelkisch 
groups insisting that the only way was for such groups 
to be incorporated into the N.S.D.A.P. ..." (23)
This was in spite of the fact that the N.S.D.A.P owed almost everything 
to such groups in the earliest days, particularly its electoral succ­
esses, as "voelkisch" groups joined with the Nazis to produce a common
(24)list of candidates. This is what happened in Coburg in the Landtag
elections of 1924, the so-called "Voelkische Block."
Interestingly, a further indication of this general right-wing trend
in Coburg was evident in the Presidential elections of 1925 where von
Hindenburg, who was standing as the choice of the Right against the
Left-Centre Wilhelm Marx, defeated his opponent nationally by a slim
margin of 14.6 million votes to 13.7 million , yet in Coburg von
(25)Hindenburg polled almost seventy:percent of the vote. Such evident
nationalist sympathies were fuelled by events in the following years 
with the founding of the National Socialist newspaper "Der Weckruf" 
in 1926 and further visits to Coburg by leading party members including 
Hitler himself and Goebbels. Coburg’s centrist newspaper, the ’Cob­
urger Tageblatt’ reported the ominously non-commital answer Goebbels 
gave to a question from his audience about Nazi policies, should they 
come to power:
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"Das weiss ich natuerlich heute noch nicht, wir 
muessten uns jedenfalls auch nach den Umstaenden 
richten ; die Hauptsache ist, dass wir erst Mai 
zur Herrschaft kommen." (26)
On the occasion of Hitler’s visit, though, there had apparently been 
no such ambiguity in the Fuehrer’s words, as the ’Coburger Tageblatt’ 
reported his argument that:
"Die 450,000 qkm deutschen Bodens seien fuer die 60.
Millionen Deutschen unzureichend... Aus dem Mangel 
an deutscher Bodenflaeche resultiere auch die riesige 
Arbeitslosigkeit.’’ (27)
Nationally, both the German Government and the Allies were striving to 
reach a settlement which would bring a period of stability to economic 
and political life in Germany, thereby removing the attraction of sim­
plistic solutions put forward by extremists' of the Right, or the Left. 
Five years after the signing of the ’armistice’, however, there were 
still two major issues to be resolved by the Allies. These were the
problem of reparations and the problem of French security, the one
(28)having at least some bearing on the other.
By November 1923, with German passive resistance against the French
occupation of the Ruhr well over, France was beginning to discover that
the operation had proved to be of little advantage. Contrary to hopes,
French industries trading with the Ruhr had found that their businesses
had deteriorated, the value of the French franc had taken a steep fall,
and a feeling of German hatred against the French had been rekind- 
(29)led. It was becoming much clearer to the Allies, including Poin­
care, that a re-think on the question of reparations was necessary.^^
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Of the two committees set up by the Reparations Commission to 'deal with 
these problems, the more important was the one with the task of discov­
ering a way of bringing stability to Germany’s stricken finances and
then devising a more realistic plan of reparations repayments, and it
(31)was chaired by General Charles Dawes. The committee presented
its proposals in April 1924 and the Allied governments gave their app­
roval in the following July. What became known as the ’Dawes Plan’ 
basically laid down that Germany's annual repayments should be reduced
and extended over a longer period of time, but this did not, in effect,
(32)reduce the total amount owed by Germany.
The other important question at this time was that of French security. 
With the size of the German nation approximately twice that of France, 
and Germany being a nation which the French considered to be espec­
ially aggressive and militaristic, France's great fear was that she
(33)might once more become the victim of German aggression. Conse­
quently,
"... France could feel secure only if two conditions 
were fulfilled. She and the countries on whose assistance 
she could rely would have to be made capable of holding 
Germany permanently in a state of ’artificial inferiority'.
In addition, France would have to possess sufficient military 
superiority of her own to ward off German invasion 
until her allies could come to her support." (34)
Fearing not only direct German aggression against her own borders,
but also the more indirect threat of German aggression against her
neighbours, France sought to settle this issue in two ways during the
early nineteen-twenties. Firstly, she signed a series of treaties and
mutual assistance pacts with Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania
(35)and Yugoslavia in an attempt to encircle Germany with friendly powers.
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Secondly, through the League of Nations, France sought reassurance 
from this world body that the security provisions contained within the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, would be a sufficient deterrent 
should Germany ever contemplate future acts of aggression against 
France. However, from as early as the First Assembly of the
League in 1920 there was prolonged debate on some of the articles 
within the Covenant which resulted in a position whereby
"... the security which it was intended should be 
provided by the League of Nations came increasingly 
to be regarded as illusionary..." (37)
An Anglo-French initiative to resolve the problem of French security 
was launched with the so-called ’Geneva Protocol' in 1924 which aimed 
at strengthening the Covenant of the League of Nations against aggre­
ssion but was thwarted by the replacement of MacDonald’s Labour
government in Britain by the Conservatives in 1925 who withdrew Brit-
(38)ish support from the Geneva Protocol.
The issue was, quite remarkably, to be finally settled by a German
proposal that the powers directly interested in the Rhineland -
France, Germany and Belgium - should enter into mutual pledges to
abstain from war for a generation, with Britain and Italy as guaran- 
(39)tors. Similar proposals had been made on earlier occasions by the
*Stresemann government but they never succeeded in allaying Poincare’s
suspicions of German motivation behind such moves. Since the
fall of Poincare, however, increasing evidence of a more conciliat-
(41)ory French stance over security had become apparent.
Months of long negotiations culminated in October 1925 with the init­
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ialing of the documents constituting the 'Locarno Pact', the central
feature of which was a treaty of mutual guarantee of the Franco-German /
and Belgo-German frontiers between France, Belgium, Germany, Italy
(42)and Great Britain.
The successful settlement of these long-standing issues - reparation 
payments and French security demands - paved the way for German entry 
into the League of Nations in 1926, and coincided with a hitherto un­
known period of internal calm and even prosperity for the Weimar Re-
(43)public. Domestic crises and threats of overthrow by extremists
appeared to have been mastered, and the atmosphere was one of seeming­
ly gradual acceptance by the German people of a republican system of 
(44)government. This was reflected in the outcome of the general
elections in December 1924 where the Communists lost one third of their
(45)seats, and the National Socialist groups more than one half. Yet,
as Karl Dietrich Bracher points out:
"The great losses’of the radical Right and Left 
were not paralleled by the sort of meaningful 
gains of the moderate parties which would have 
facilitated the formation of a democratic 
government." (46)
Alan Bullock comments similarly, in that despite what he describes in 
simple terms as a situation where, in the period between 1924-29, 
there was:
"... more food, more money, more jobs and more 
security ... the foundations of this sudden 
prosperity were exceedingly shaky.." (47)
The precarious nature of the domestic situation was highlighted in the
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Presidential elections following Ebert's death in February 1925 when 
narrow factional interests somehow succeeded in combining to allow 
the old soldier-hero of the First World War, von Hindenburg to become 
the figurehead of a republic whose character and principles were en­
tirely at odds with his own beliefs.
The assumption from the outside was, then, that the Weimar Republic 
was beginning to lay down roots which, in the course of time, would 
provide for a strong, healthy republic. This view was, however, based 
on the premise of continuing good fortune in matters of the economy 
and relations with foreign powers. It did not take account of the 
desperate internal struggles in which Streseman was engaged with the 
parties on the far left and right of the political spectrum as regards 
pushing through major policy decisions. Additionally, Stresemann 
often received only tacit support from the Social Democrats who, in 
spite of sharing the centre ground, throughout the 1924-28 Reichstag 
were in opposition, although they were the strongest single party:
"Consequently, the Social Democrats with their 
vast potential power, were deprived of the opp­
ortunity to exert political influence in their 
own Republic, and moreover at a time when a pre­
republican Field Marshal rather than a Social 
Democrat presided over the Republic." (49)
Stresemann's last success was achieved in 1929 when a final settlement 
to the reparations question was made in return for the withdrawal of 
Allied troops from the Rhineland. This was the outcome of a meeting 
in Paris in February 1929 of a Committee of experts examining the 
question of reparations in the light of changing circumstances in the 
world's economy. Under the 'Young Plan', the name taken from
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Owen Young, who chaired the committee in Paris, a final sum "Which
Germany would have to pay in reparations was established, a sum greatly
reduced from that indicated under the ’Dawes Plan’ five years earlier,
and international control over German institutions such as the Reich-
sbank and the railways, originally implemented to ensure reparations
payments were made, was terminated. In addition to this, of course,
foreign troops were withdrawn from Germany five years ahead of the
(51)timetable laid down in the Treaty of Versailles.
During the initial period of this German recovery Adolf Hitler had, of
course, been whiling away his time in quite some comfort under impris-
(52)onment in Landsberg, a small town some fifty miles west of Munich.
He used the time to write "Mein Kampf" and to reflect that as his
frontal assault on the Republic had failed completely, the National
(53)Socialists would have to take up the cover of legality. It was
during this time, too, that the National Socialist party fell apart as
wranglings amonst the leading members left after the arrest or flight
(54)of the original leadership had resulted in the party's demise.
However, Hitler had been released from prison before the end of 1924
(55)and had re-founded the National Socialist party in February 1925.
Hitler's new emphasis on legality was merely a question of tactics, 
for the aim of overthrowing the Republic and all its institutions re­
mained unaltered. Hitler's task over the following years was to est­
ablish absolute control over the Party by ridding it of any not DreD-
ared to lend him unquestioning o b e d i e n c e  as supreme leader, and then
(56)to build up the party into a major force in national German politics. 
Given the general mood of confidence and the sense of recovery between
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1924'"kid 1929, Hitler and his party made seemingly little headway as 
7 regards any kind of breakthrough.
The nationalist parties of the Right had, in fact, been 'chipping away' 
at the Republic since its birth, starting with violent denunciations 
of the regime which signed the Treaty of Versailles. The aggressive 
nationalist campaign - and it was one which Hitler's National Social­
ist party was never to drop - was sustained not against Germany's 
'external foes' i.e. the Western Allies who, in their position of
strength, were able to impose this treaty on Germany, but rather
(57)against the republican parties at home.
Hitler and the National-Socialists were particularly unrelenting in 
their attacks on Stresemann's foreign policy:
"The very idea of reconciliation, of settlement by 
agreement, roused his (Hitler's) anger. An appeal 
to nationalist resentment was an essential part of 
Hitler's stock-in-trade; at all costs that resent­
ment must be kept alive and inflamed. France must be 
represented as the external enemy, and Stresemann's 
policy of "fulfilment" as blind illusion, or better 
still, deliberate treachery." (58)
r
Both the Dawes' Plan and its successor, the Young Plan, were the butt
of vicious nationalist accusations of servility and betrayal directed
against Stresemann, who, shortly before his death in October 1929,
(59)had to endure a fierce onslaught from the nationalist parties.
On 9th July 1929 a national committee, incorporating such right-wing 
groupings as the Pan-German League, 'Stahlhelm' and the National 
Socialists, was formed to promote a law "against the enslavement of 
the German people" as National Socialist Reichstag Deputy Frick called 
it - which would oblige the government to reject the whole idea of
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Germany’s war guilt and with it the new reparations settlement. 
Furthermore, the committee stated that every German minister and pub­
lic servant who had signed agreements such as the Young Plan should 
be prosecuted for treason.
’’This radical and unrealistic move failed completely, 
but the wild campaign it unleashed... presented the 
National Socialists with a second great opportunity 
for the mobilisation of their propaganda and organis­
ational apparatus. But above all it took the 
N.S.D.A.P out of the isolation of a radical splinter 
group and brought it, as the most militant fighting 
organisation^ withing the frame of a socially influent­
ial, well-financed coalition of the anti-Republican 
Right..." (62)
It was during this campaign that Hitler made his debut on the national 
political stage in Germany and thanks to the funds and contacts avail­
able to Alfred Hugenberg, the initiator of the committee, Hitler’s
/ gi \propaganda reached its widest audience yet. The plebiscite which
stemmed from the campaign had resulted in a resounding defeat for the 
nationalists, with fewer than fourteen percent of the electorate supp­
orting the move against the Republic. However, as well as the
doors which were opened to the Nazis as a result of the campaign, 
Bracher identifies a further significant feature in that the outcome 
of the plebiscite:
"once more gave the democrat’s that sense of false 
security which was responsible for the underesti­
mation of the N.S.D.A.P and the weak defences in 
the year to come." (65)
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CHAPTER 7.
COBURG, THE NAZIS FIRST TOWN.
"Prior to Hitler's emergence,--outbreaks of anti- 
semi tic violence were rare in Germany, unlike Eastern 
Europe. Of course, anti-semitism was ever present, 
waiting for fresh opportunities..." (1)
Just one of these "fresh opportunities" arose in Coburg in 1929. Franz
Schwede, leader of the National Socialists in Coburg and an employee
of the municipal public works which supplied Coburg’s energy needs was
dismissed from his post. The municipal works was run, ultimately, by
the town council and it was becoming increasingly embarrassed by
Schwede’s political extremism which culminated in abusive attacks on
(2)the general manager of an important meat-products firm in Coburg.
The manager, a man called Friedmann, was Jewish and he became the vic­
tim of a virulent anti-semitic campaign lead largely by Schwede through
(3)the Nazi paper "Der Weckruf". Friedmann finally reacted by telling
the municipal works that he had plans to take his firm’s business away
from them by purchasing his own diesel generator to supply his firm’s
(4)energy requirements. Faced with the loss of a valued customer
the matter was reported to the town council - the ’Stadtrat’ - by the
managers at the municipal works, and the Stadtrat voted by thirteen
votes to ten in favour of Schwede’s dismissal, having borne in mind
that Schwede had, on a previous occasion, already received an official
warning because cf his abusive, unsubstantiated allegations against
(5)not only businessmen like Friedmann, but also political opponents.
The nationalist Right was immediately spurred into action, calling 
protest meetings and demonstrations, and at once broadening its attack,
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aiming a blovTat the Coburg Stadtrat.
"Jede Stunde des jetzigen Stadtrats sei ein 
Schaden fuer Coburg, denn ein solcher Stadtrat 
stehe auf dem Boden des Marxismus.” (6).
A petition calling for a referendum on the behaviour of the Stadtrat
(7)was successfully collected. Whilst the Nazi propaganda machine 
swung into action with emotional calls on the entire population of 
Coburg to turn out and vote in the referendum to be held on 5th May 
1929, it was as though in a state of shock the socialists and their 
supporters could do little to counter the frenzied activity of the 
National Socialists, apart from warnings in the party’s newspaper, 
the Coburger Volksblatt:
’’Die Einwohnerschaft Coburgs all ein hatte die Zeche 
zu bezahlen ... Nur im Chaos liegt das Heil dieser 
•zerstoerenden Kraefte, die im Nationalsozialismus 
zusammengeschlossen sind ... Aber auch das Buergertum 
wird es sich reiflich ueberlegen muessen ob es sich 
unter das Joch einer Hakenkreuz - Rathausdiktatur 
beugen will.” (8)
Such appeals were to have little effect on the majority of the Coburg
(9)people in the face of ever growing Nazi attacks. They appealed to 
the ’sense of duty’ and ’patriotic loyalty’ of the Coburg people, 
urging them to vote against the Stadtrat and against Friedmann:
”... weil Euer vaterlaendisches Empfinden es nicht 
erlauben.darf, dass man einen deutschen Frontsoldaten, 
der seine Pflicht tat, einem juedischen Kriegsgewinnler 
opfert ... Weil Euer Ehrgefuehl sich dagegen verwahren 
muss, dass 25,000 alteingesessene Coburger einem 
zugewandertem Juden gehorchen sollen.
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Darum : Deutschland den Deutschen! 
Coburg den Coburgern!
Und Palaestina denen, die 
dort hingehoeren! n (10)
The outcome was that over two-thirds of the Coburg voters supported 
what was in effect this Nazi-sponsored vote of no confidence in the 
Stadtrat, with all its anti-semitic and anti-republican trimmings. 
Hitler himself sent a congratulatory telegramme:
"Ihnen und unseren Kaempfern in Coburg Glueckwuensche 
und Anerkennung zum grossen Erfolg." (12)
For Werner Faber, too, it was a truly great victory. The people of 
Coburg had, with this vote:
"... dem alten Stadtrat schon ein halbes Jahr 
vor Ablauf seiner Regierungszeit das Lebenslicht 
ausblies und damit ihrem Willen dass mit schwarz- 
rot-gelben system auch in den Rathaeusern endlich 
einmal aufgeraeumt werden musse, unmissverstaendlich 
Ausdruck verlieh." (13)
The National Socialists were jubilant and confident of success in the
forthcoming elections which this referendum had forced, while the
(14)socialists seemed at a loss to know how to respond. One year later
at the national level:
"... die verhaengnisvolle Flucht aus der Regierung im 
Fruehjahr 1930, die die Schlusskrise der parlamentarischen 
Demokratie in Deutschland eingeleitet und ... auch die Weimarer 
Republik selbst in eine auswegslose Situation manoevriert 
hat, ist nicht zuletzt aus diesem Verhalten (der S.P.D)
... daran zu erklaeren..." (15)
The Nazi propaganda machine which had already wound itself up to its
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hitherto most effective peak, rolled on. ' ©h the eve of the new elect­
ions for the Stadtrat on 23rd June 1929, the Nazis fplayed their ace'. 
Whilst the other contesting parties seemed-content to let the local 
politicians battle it out, the Nazis threw their most able figure into 
the campaign - the Fuehrer himself.
"Immer ist der Fuehrer da, wo ihn die Bewegung 
am notigsten braucht - immer ist er da, wo es gilt, 
eine letzte, grosse und fuer die Bewegung wichtige 
Entscheidung zu treffen." (16)
The Nazis had waged a fierce campaign and with Hitlers help they succ­
eeded in winning over the majority of the Coburg people. For the first 
time anywhere in Germany a majority National Socialist town council 
was elected with the N.S.D.A.P taking thirteen of the twenty-five 
council seats.
"Beachten Sie die Ergebnisse der letzten Wahlen, 
schauen Sie nach Coburg, wo unsere Partei schon 
die absolute Mehrheit erreicht hat. Sind wir 
einmal so weit im Reiche, wir brauchen kein Republik 
-schutzgesetz, wir werden sie so aufhaengen." (17)
So Goebbels gleefully taunted the Left in the Reichstag when the news 
broke. Yet again to their eternal discredit, the Left seemed unmoved 
by it all.
The Coburg electorate had an early opportunity to reverse the result
of the election of June 1929 when the regular local elections were
held in the following December. The December election campaign was
characterised however, once more by the failure, particularly on the
part of the socialists, to fully comprehend the extent of the Nazi
(18)threat, thereby lending weight to Bracher's argument that:
"The history of National Socialism, in effect, is the 
history of its fatal underestimation.” (19)
The S.P.D. campaign seemed inexplicably complacent in the face of the 
Nazi onslaught which broadened its attack from’abusive anti-semitism 
to malicious personal attacks on the Coburg Left, levelling charges of
ia negligent mismanagement of Coburg’s affairs against the S.P.Ds local 
government representatives. Again, it was only the Nazis who
were, to' fully--understand the significance of the Coburg local electionsV . _ . >
by calling on their most able speaker, Hitler, to give a final boost 
to their campaign. Hitler appealed to the Coburg electorate to ^ pion­
eer a new direction in German politics and to create a show-piece 
for National Socialism which the rest of the Reich could see and 
admire.
”Es ist Wahnsinn, wenn jemand glaubt die Kommunen 
nach anderen Gesichtspunkten zu leiten als das 
Reich." (21)
This appeal found favour with the Coburg people, for they returned a 
Nazi majority to the town hall, ensuring that the Nazis could now 
demonstrate in Coburg:
"... was unser deutsches Volk zu erwarten hat, 
wenn as sein Geschick der Freiheitsbewegung 
unseres Fuehrers Adolf Hitler anvertraut..." (22)
The nature of the two campaigns conducted by the Nazis for the June
and December elections in Coburg demonstrated the pseudo-legality of
the tactics Hitler had determined to pursue after the failure of the
(23)Kapp Putsch in 1920 and his own attempted coup in 1923. Although 
Hitler had given up hope of a successful frontal assault on the
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Republic, the public disorder tactics employed by his S.A. unites during 
the events like the Coburg ’German Day’ in 1922, combined/with sus­
tained, slanderous personal attacks on various people or groups of 
people in German society, had proved an effective way of securing 
’legitimate’ electoral success, as in Coburg in 1929. It was, there­
fore, with a feeling of some optimism that the Nazis launched their 
national election campaign for the Reichstag elections in September
1930. The results, however, surpassed even their own greatest expect­
ations as their campaign, characterised by a marked increase in public 
disorder in the larger towns as extremist feelings were whipped up by
violent, abusive attacks on favourite targets such as Jews, Socialists,
(24)Communists and the Allies, resulted in a massively increased vote.
A Nazi vote of some 800,000 in 1928 was increased to 6.5 million, ther­
eby raising their representation in the Reichstag from 12 to 107 seats,
(25)thus making the N.S.D.A.P the second largest party in the country.
The rest of the story of Hitler’s rise to power is well documented, as 
are the tragic consequences of his successes.
(135)
Notes
1. BRACHER, KARL DIETRICH. "The German Dictatorship. The Origins, 
Structure and Consequences of National Socialism" Peregrine. 
Harraondsworth. 1978, p.66.
2. ASMALSKY,L. "Der Nationalsozialismus und die N.S.D.A.P in 
Coburg 1922-1933" Unpublished thesis. University of Wuerzburg.
1969, pp.46ff.
3. See above p.111.
Also ASMALSKY, L. op. cit, pp.46ff.
4. ASMALSKY, L. op. cit, p.47.
5. ibid.
6. ’Coburger Zeitung1 9th March 1929.
7. This kind of ‘direct democracy’ under the system of ’volksbe-
gehren’ (popular petition) and ’volksentscheid’ (referendum) 
still exists in some federal states in West Germany. If a 
certain percentage of the electorate signs a petition, the'state 
government can then be ’petitioned’ to order a referendum.
8. Coburger Volksblatt’13th March 1929.
"The population of Coburg alone will have to pay the price...
The salvation of this destructive force which is inherent in
National Socialism is to be found in times of chaos. The people
will have to consider carefully whether they want to be harn- 
^ssed under the yoke of the swastika and town hall dictator- /v
ship."
9. ASMALSKY, L. op. cit, pp.49ff.
.10. ’Per Weckruf’ in ASMALSKY, L. op. cit, p.50.
"... your loyalty to the fatherland will not allow you to see 
a German war veteran, who did his duty, sacrificed for the sake
(136)
of a Jewish war profiteer ... your sense of duty 
will not allow 25,000 old-established Coburgers to 
give in to an immigrant Jew. And so:
Germany for Germans!
Coburg for Coburgers!
And Palestine for those who belong ther.e!"
11. ASMALSKY, L. op. cit, p.50.
12. SCHWEDE, FRANZ. "Kampf un Coburg" Verlag. Frz. Eher. Nauhf.
Muenchen 1939, p.145.
"Congratulations to you and your supporters in Coburg in recog­
nition of a great victory."
13. FABER, WERNER. "Coburg unterm Hakenkreuz." Verlag. Frz. Nachf. 
Muenchen. 1932, p.10.
"... switched the light out on the old town council six 
months before the end of its term of office, and given clear
expression to their will that the (republican) black, red, and
yellow system must be cleared out once and for all from local
town halls."
14. ASMALSKY, L. op. cit, p.51.
15. BRACHER, KARL DIETRICH. SAUER,W. SCHULZ, G. "Die Nationalsoz- 
ialistische Machtergreifung" Holn. I960, p.33
"__ the fateful flight from government in Spring, 1930 which
heralded the final crisis for German parliamentary democracy 
... and placed the Weimar Republic in a hopeless position, is 
to be explained not least by this behaviour (of the S.P.D.)."
16. SCHWEDE, FRANZ, op. cit, p.152.
"The Fuehrer is always there when he is most needed. He is al­
ways there where it matters to make a huge, final - and for the 
movement - important decision."
17. "Coburger Volksblatt" 13th July 1929.
"Look carefully at the results of the last elections, look at
(137)
Coburg where our party has already won an absolute majority. 
Onde we are that far on in the Reich, we will have no need of 
laws to'protect the Republic, we will be rid."
18. See ASMALSKY, L. op. cit, Chapter 2.
19. BRACHER, KARL DIETRICH, op. cit, p.69.
20. FABER, WERNER, op. cit, pp.12ff.
21. ’Coburger Zeitung’ 5th December 1929.
”It is madness to believe that the localities should be gov­
erned in a different manner to the Reich.”
22. FABER, WENER. op.cit, p.12.
”... what our German people should expect if it places its 
destiny in the hands of our leader, Adolf Hitler, and his free­
dom movement."
23. See above, pp.53-55 and pp.101ff.
24. BULLOCK, ALAN. "Hitler. A Study in Tyranny" Pelican. Harmcnds- 
worth. 1983, p.159.
25. ibid.
(138)
CONCLUSION
In his study of National Socialism, Karl Dietrich Bracher concludes 
his first chapter with a look ahead to 1933 and identifies the atmos­
phere in which National Socialism was allowed *to flourish and attain 
the position which enabled it to challenge the ’status quo’ of 
Europe through military aggression.
”... the fragility of the democratic tradition and 
the powerful remnants of authoritarian governmental and 
social institutions... susceptibility to nationalistic, 
imperialistic ideas ... widespread disgruntlement over 
the Versailles peace ... fear of proletarization and 
communism." (1)
Nowhere were these pre-conditions more evident than in Coburg during 
the eleven years between the end of the First World War and that 
ominous first electoral success in 1929.
Despite the union with the more politically radical region of Gotha, 
Coburg had developed into a somewhat liberalised yet staunchly mona- 
rchistic state by the early twentieth century. It was liberalised 
in.the sense that an influential middle class of small businessmen 
and professionals had emerged during a period of economic prosperity 
in the nineteenth century, yet because of the size, diversity and 
nature of Coburg’s economy, there was no corresponding development 
of any kind of an industrial proletariat. Coburg’s economy relied 
to a certain extent on its productive agricultural base, and accord­
ingly the frustration felt by many Germans at their plight as they 
faced severe food shortages during the last year of the First World 
War, was not so great a factor in the Coburg region in mobilising 
popular agitation behind the demands for a negotiated peace. In
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fact, events now referred to as the "German Revolution" could 
scarcely be described as a spontaneous revolt in Coburg, for the 
first move was initiated by the commander of the Coburg garrison.
The overriding anxiety of the authorities in doburg was the possible 
influence of the much-feared radicals in neighbouring Gotha, and so 
with masterly skill in negotiation in the shape of, above all, the 
Duke's 'prime minister', Hermann Quarck, the pace of events in Coburg 
was largely dictated by the ruling powers. Aided by the hesitancy 
and inexperience, as well as unpreparedness, of the socialists in 
Coburg, Quarck had, within six months of that 'revolution' steered 
Coburg away from any form of republicanisaticn to a situation where 
there was little change in the political machinery. Admittedly 
Quarck had had to accept the abdication of the Duke, but then as if 
to compensate he had managed to have himself elected to a position 
where, in times of emergency, he was vested with presidential-like 
powers to govern Coburg alone.
The campaign which led to Coburg's decision to join in a treaty of 
union with Bavaria highlighted the deep-rooted nature of conserva­
tism amongst Coburg's middle class and the extent to which the lead­
ership of the local S.P.D., itself predominantly middle class, lacked 
any particularly progressive tendencies. Leading socialists Klingler 
and Artmann were part of the delegation which sought assurances from 
Bavaria that the future of Coburg's cultural possessions such as the 
theatre, the castle and its contents, and other of the Duke's resi­
dences would be guaranteed. On the whole, socialism in Coburg was 
very much that of the Majority Socialist blend which had not part­
icularly wanted a republic and would quite willingly have accepted a
(140)
constitutional monarchy. The Majority Socialists saw their role to 
a large extent as that of supporting the maintenance of law and order 
in the months of uncertainty immediately after the war, and working 
with the old imperial bureaucracy to bring stability back to German 
life. The absence of any strong Independent Socialist force in 
Coburg resulted in little, if any, opposition from the Left to this 
stance. Accordingly Coburg, as indeed most areas throughout the 
Reich, witnessed the survival of the spirit of imperial Germany in 
the unreformed civil service, judiciary and army.
Nowhere was this spirit stronger than in Bavaria where Kurt Eisner's 
attempt to establish a Bavarian Republic and subsequent attempts to 
create a Bavarian Soviet based in Munich were ruthlessly swept aside 
by a right-wing backlash in 1919 and 1920. Then, whilst the rest of 
the Reich expressed horror at the Kapp Putsch in March 1920, the 
Right in Munich was staging its own quiet, bloodless and successful 
coup as pressure from the Army arid the Police, backed by right-wing 
groups, forced the socialists to resign from office.
In this way, Bavaria rapidly became a safe haven from which the var­
ious right-wing anti-republican parties and groups could launch their 
attacks on what they claimed to be the Bolshevik, Jew-ridden system 
of central government in Berlin. In the atmosphere of counter-revol­
ution generated by the Bavarian Government, a host of nationalist, 
imperialist organisations flourished with the support of. many of the 
leading military figures like General Ludendorff and Admiral Tirpitz 
who had fled to Bavaria to seek refuge in the aftermath of Germany's 
collapse in 1918.
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Right-wing elements in Coburg, too, seemed heartened by the measure 
of protection they could enjoy now they were part of Bavaria. There 
was, in the early nineteen twenties, a noticeable increase in the 
activity of a variety of veterans’ associations and other national­
ist groups like ’Bund Wiking', ’Stahlhelm’, the 'Deutschvoelkischer 
Schutz - und‘Trutzbund’ and the ’Jungdeutsche Orden’. The much- 
respected Duke, Carl Eduard, was still present, despite his abdicat­
ion, to lend his considerable prestige and political influence to the 
activities of such groups.
Apart from a few bloody faces in public house brawls there was little 
effective action taken by the Coburg socialists against the Right, 
and, like their counterparts in many places throughout the Reich, 
the Coburg socialists seemed powerless to counter growing anti­
republican feelings which were being fuelled by the Right’s success­
ful exploitation of events like the signing of the Versailles Treaty 
and the French occupation of the Ruhr. Coburg was becoming rapidly 
caught up in the conflict between Munich and Berlin, and came under 
the particular scrutiny of Reich officials after providing Hitler 
with an opportunity to test his rabble-rousing tactics for the first 
time on an audience outside his Munich power-base. In October 1922 
Hitler had visited Coburg with his S.A. to join in the celebrations 
of the ’Third German Day' and had come away having provided his 
Nazi movement with the kind of tradition so important to a party 
which placed so much emphasis on the glories of the past-, the myth­
ological stories of heroic struggles. In the future, the Nazis 
could look back to those events in Coburg as a landmark in their 
early struggle to save the Reich from the evils of Bolshevism. For
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the local Nazi party it provided the impetus needed to bring the 
party properly into the political arena.
For all the talk of the German Army’s neutrality during this period, 
its stance did, in fact, support the resurgence of the old imperial­
istic nationalism. Whilst neutrality meant not openly attacking the 
Republic, it also meant a reluctance to offer the Republic necessary 
support either in checking dissent within its own ranks, or in 
acting with the same aggression against right-wing threats as it did 
against perceived threats from the Left. Ultimately it was, indeed, 
the supportive attitude of the Bavarian Army towards the Munich 
government’s overt challenges to Berlin’s authority that proved 
crucial. Following the failure of his own Putsch attempt in 1923, 
Hitler had gone to great pains to exonerate the Army from any in­
volvement in the plot. He realised that the support of the Army was 
essential in order to fulfil his political ambitions, and by clearing 
the Army he had laid the path open for a future working relationship. 
Hitler enjoyed particular success in winning the support of the 
young officer corps which was growing increasingly disenchanted and 
impatient with the Army Command’s apparent acceptance of the Republic. 
By vehemently denouncing the Versailles Treaty and calling for the 
creation of a large National Army, Hitler soon won the support, too, 
of the Bavaria Army Command under Major General Ritter von Epp.
Although Germany came to enjoy a period of relative calm around 1925 
and 1926 with the settlement of long-standing problems like the repa­
rations question and French security demands, and an economy which 
appeared to be mastering the problems of runaway inflation, the
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political situation within the Reich was still very precarious. This 
was perhaps best highlighted during the 1925 Presidential elections 
when disarray amongst the Centre and Left parties over which candi­
date to support, effectively allowed the election as Head of State in 
a Republic, one of the staunchest supporters of the old imperialist, 
autocratic regime, von Hindenburg.
Whilst the Nazis could make little political headway during those 
years of apparent calm in the mid nineteen-twenties, they had already 
discovered a most potent propaganda ploy. The trick was to convince 
people that whilst they suffered particular hardships during times of 
economic and social disorder, certain groups could be identified as 
somehow escaping any such misery. Abroad, the Allies could be picked 
out, and at home it was the Jews. Anti-semitism had already been a 
feature of the Coburg Landtag elections in 1924 when the alliance of 
right-wing parties, the so-called ’Voelkischer Block’, was elected to 
power on a programme which included stripping Jews of all their 
rights as German citizens. As the situation deteriorated once more at 
home and abroad in 1928 and 1929 anti-semitism again reared its head 
in Coburg with spectacular consequences. Combined with a ruthless 
attack on the Coburg town-hall ’Marxists’, a violent campaign against 
a leading Coburg Jewish businessman, Friedmann, clearly had some 
appeal to the Coburg electorate as they elected a Nazi majority to the 
town council twice in one year.
The crucial role of the ’Fuehrer’ in laying the foundations of that 
success was a clear indication of what Karl Dietrich Bracher describes 
as the ’special factor’ in the early days of National Socialism.
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"... the tremendously important part played by the 
spectacular rise and near religious veneration of a 
Fuehrer." (2)
The writings of the two leading Coburg Nazis at that time, Franz
Schwede and Werner Faber, both clearly document the extent of their 
i (3 )commitment to Hitler. Schwede, who was at the centre of the 
Friedmann incident which led directly to the Nazi take-over in 
Coburg, concludes his book on the ’struggle for Coburg’ with an indi­
cation of his total belief in Hitler.
"Es ging nicht um mich und mein Schicksal. Es ging 
um den Sieg der grossen Idee Adolf Hitlers." (4)
It seems today, however, as though a rather perverse sense of justice 
has been effected in that town which was first attracted to Hitler.
His vision of an expansion of the German ’Lebensraum’ to accommodate 
all Germanic peoples, which he explained to the Coburg people as early 
as 1927, has achieved, in effect, the opposite of its intended out­
come. Coburg is today isolated from its former partner in the Duchy 
of Coburg-Gotha and bordered on three sides by the consequences of 
Hitler’s excesses in Europe : the fenced divide which separates the 
German nation, and East from West.
(145)
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FABER, WERNER. "Coburg unterm Hakenkreuz." Verlag. Frz. 
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APPENDIX 1.
PRESIDENT WILSON1S FOURTEEN POINTS
Derived from HAIGH,R.H. MORRIS,D.S. PETERS,A.R.
German - Soviet Relations in the Weimar Era. Friendship from Necess­
ity. Gower. Aldershot, 1985* ' ' ~
I Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there 
shall be no private international understanding of any kind 
but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public 
view.
II Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside terri­
torial waters, alike in peace and in war, except national 
action for the enforcement of international covenants.
III The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and
the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all 
of the nations consenting to the peace and associating them­
selves for its maintenance.
IV Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments
will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic 
safety.
V A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of
all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the 
principle that in determining all such questions of sovere­
ignty the interests of the populations concerned must have 
equal weight with the equitable claims.of the government 
whose title is to be determined.
VI The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement 
of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best 
and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world
in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opport­
unity for the independent determination of her own political 
development and national policy and assure her:of a sincere 
welcome into the society of free nations under institutions 
of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance 
also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. 
The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the 
months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of 
their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their 
own interests, and of their intelligence and unselfish 
sympathy.
VII Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and 
restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which 
she enjoys in common with all other free nations . No other 
single act will serve as this will serve to restore con­
fidence among the nations in the laws which they have
(v)
themselves set and determined for the government of their 
relations with one another. Without this healing act the 
whole structure and validity of international law is fore­
ver impaired.
VII All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions 
restored, and the wrong done to France*by Prussia in 1871 
in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the 
peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, 
in order that peace may once more be made secure in the 
interest of all.
IX A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected 
along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.
X The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place.among the 
nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be 
accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.
XI Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, should be evacuated; 
occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and 
secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several 
Balkan states to one another determined by friendly 
counsel along historically established lines of allegiance 
and nationality; and international guarantees of the 
political and economic independence and territorial 
integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered 
into.
XII The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should 
be assured of a secure sovereignty, but the other national­
ities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured
an undoubted security of life and absolutely unmolested 
opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardonelles 
should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships 
and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.
XIII An independent Polish state should be erected which should 
include the territories inhabited by indisputably.Polish 
populations, which should be assured a free and secure . 
access to the sea, and whose political and economic inde­
pendence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed
by international covenant.
XIV A general association of nations must be formed under 
specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual 
guarantees of political independence and territorial 
integrity to great and small states alike.
(vi)
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APPENDIX 2
The Treaty-of Union between Coburg and Bavaria 
Derived from UNGELENK, L. Coburg im Weltkrieg 191 A-1918 
Rossteutscher Verlag. Coburg, 1922.
©taatsoertrag
.3&?ijcfjen Sen ^ m jtaatcn  ^SaSjccn unb Cofiucg 
u6ce bte S3cremigung S ofw gS  nut S3aycEn.
© ie  O^egierungen ber greiflaatcn 33agcm unb (Soburg finb in bem 35effreben, 
bie gioifdjen beiben £anbern unb tf?rer 33eo6[£erung Se{?el?cnben 35egicbungen 
. inniger 3 ufctnnnenge^odgBei't nod? cnger gu geftalten unb bie bcibcrfeitigen gemein- 
famen iDirtfd?aftI.id?en unb hilturellen 3ntere{fen gu pflegen unb gu forbem, uberein- 
. gerommen, eincn ©taatsoertrag icegen ber "Gereinigung ber beiben £anbcr 
abgufcgliefjen.
© ie  gu biefcm: Sioedf ^rnannten 35eoofImdd?tigten, namlicf) 
fu r . ^ a g e rn  DKinifferprdfibent ip  o f f  m a n  n,
V  3uf?igminijler D r . O K u H e r ,  ' ; .
fur (Soburg © taatsrat s t i n g i e r ,
. CfKinifferialbireftor D r. g r i t f d ? ,  • *. 1 •
i- ^aben ficp, oorbebaltlidb ber ©enebmigung ber £anbtage oon 33cgem unb (Soburg 
unb oorbebaftlicb bes nad? Qlrt. 18 ber "Berfaffung bes ©eutfd?en Q^dcbes com 
f‘ 11. Qluguft { g i g  erforberb'c^en Dbeidjsgefetjes, uber fofgenbe 13uncte geeinigt:
§ I-
© as ©ebiet bes greiffaates (Soburg udrb mit bem © eb id  bes greifiaates 
33agern gu einem einF>:i'tlfcf?en ©ebiet oerefnigt. © ie  ©taatsbobdtsrecbte uber bes 
.© eb id  oon (Soburg gebcn mit ber "Uereinigung auf Q^agern uber.
' § 2.
© as ©ebiet bes greiftaates (Soburg mit QLusnabme bes Qlmtes ^onigsberg 
(b. i. ber © tab t i^onigsbcrg in granfen unb ber £anbgcmcinben Qlltcrshaufen, 
© drflis, (Srlsborf, IpcUingen, .Kdsiau, -Kottenbrunn unb Slaffad?) mirb bem -Kreis 
Oberfrcnrcn, bas Qlrtu f\onigsberg bem -Kreis Unterfranrcn unb QLfcbaffcnburg unb 
gioar bem >3cgir! Jpofbcim angegliebert. © ie  (Stabte (Soburg, 3Xeuftabt unb IRobacb 
bteiben unmittelbar.
§ 3*
3K it ber Ucreinigung uocrbcn bic QIngcbbrtgcn bes grdflcatcs (Soburg, foiDcit 
fie in <5agcrn obcr im ©ebiete bes greiffaates (Soburg U)oF)nen, barjerifege © taats- 
ange^orige,- atte ubrigcn icerben auf Qlntrag aud? of>ne oorberige ^Cieberlafjung 
. in ben. bagerifeben ©taatcoerbanb aufgenommen. r
(vii)
' ' §4-  v-
Qln. ber auf bfe Bereinigung (Soburgs mi't 33arjern folgenbcn £anbtagsioabt 
in 35agcrn ncbmen bi’c bisbcrigcn coburgifd?en £anbesteile nach DKaBgabc ber in ' 
35ancrn gcltcnbcn 35ejiimmungen tcil. 53is gu biefcm 3 cdpunrt orbnct bie coburgifcnc 
£anbesoerfammlung brei DKiigiicber in ben bagcrifcpcn £anbtag ab, bie in biejem 
© it} unb ©timme ba° cn ur*b bie glcicbcn 3\cd?tc uric bic bagcriid?cn £anbtcgs- 
abgeorbncten gcnic£cn. ©ebon in ber gurijchcn ber 35cftdiigung bes gegen- 
iDdriigcn ©taotsocrtrags unb ber Bereinigung loerbcn bie brei coburgifd;cn Qlb- 
georbncten gu ben Berbanblungen bes bagerifd?en £anbtags mit beratenber 
©timme gugclaffen.
§5-
© ie bagcrifcbc Berfaffung tritt mit bem ©age ber Bcrcinigung im ©ebiete 
bes greifiaates (Soburg oon felbji in -Kraft.
§ 6. ;
3m ubrigen bleiben bie im 3 ritp u n !t ker "Bereinigung im ©ebiete bes gre i- • 
fiaates (Soburg geltenben ©efctje unb Berorbnungen in Kraft, bis fie aufgeboben 
obcr geanbert uocrben.
. Q5ei i^rer Qlufbebung ober QInberung urirb loabrenb einer Bbergangsgcit , 
oon gioei 3 abrcn oon ber Bereinigung an ber oon (Soburg fur Sbergangsfragen ’ j 
befkllte Qlusfcbufi gef?ort uoerben. ©iefe 35cfiimmung finbet !eine Qlnroenbung bei ,;| 
Qlnberungen, bie im -fpinbfid auf bie Dleic^sgefetjgebung ober bei ©rlaffung neuer
bagerifer>er £anbesgefei?e unb Berorbnungen notioenbig icerben. 1 -ri
§ 7- !
© ie gum ©omdnenoermogen (§ 1 bes Bertrags mit bem -foergog (Sari ©buarb 
oon’ ©ad)fen (Soburg unb ©otf?a oom 7 . 3uni 1919) geborenben QBalbungen, ©uter 
unb fonfiigcn £iegcnfd?aften bes greifiaates (Soburg finb mit 0^udfid)t auf bie oer- : 
traglicp fefigelcgien (Rcdrie ber „(Soburger fanbesfiiftung' als cine in fid? gefd>lof[ene 
Bermogcnsmaffe (genannt ©omanengut) oon einer in (Soburg gu erricfjtenben ftaat- ' 
lichen Seborba (gorfl- unb ©omdnenamt) unb baneben oon ben loeiter erforber- < 
lichen gorfiamtern gu oerioalten.
Beraufscrungen burfcn nur mit 3ufiimmung bes in § 6 Qlbfafy II bes © taa ts- • 
oertrags begeicpneten Qlusfcbuffes ftattflnben. Qln bie © telle biefes Qlusfdbuffes tritt 
nacb Qibiauf ber Xlbergangsgeit oon 2 3 abren &cr Borflanb ber (Soburgcr £anbes- •; 
fiiftung. © ie 3 ufrimmung ifl nidri erforberlicb, foioeit gladjcn oon loenigcr als 1 ha j 
in grage lommcn ober ber Beraufcerungspreis, bei ©aufd>oertrdgen ber ©egen- "i 
flanbsioeri, ben 33etrag oon funftaufcnb DKarf nid?t uberffcigt. © er © rios aus ben • 
Beraufserungcn iff gur ©rbaltung, Berbefferung ober Bermebrung bes ©omanenguts . 
gu oerioenbcn. 55ei Bcrpad;tungen if? auf bie urirtfcbaftlicbcn Q5cb>urfniffe ber 35e- ! 
oolirerung bes greifiaates (Soburg loeitgebenb-O^udfidpt gu nebmen.
-- . ' ^ v:'v: . •'§ 3. ; ;■ • ’ •.
*■ © oftte fid> bie gortfubrung ber £anbrentenban! in.CSoburg^burcb ben bagerifcben * 
i © taa t ober bie bagerifcbe ©taatsban£ afs ungioedmafjig cruoeifen, fo iff ber Sarjen'fcbe *
. © taa t bereit, ibre Hmuoanbftmg fn eine 35egir!sanfkrft bei bem Q3egirfstage bes 
frinftigen Q5egirts (Soburg in bie *D3ege gu (eiten unb, fafts biefer ber (Srricbtung 
einer folcben Qlnflalt gufftmmt, bie. UmioanMung gu forbern.
,  § 9- : • '
© ie ©taatsbeamten (©taatsbiencr im © inne bes ©efetjes uber ben S io if-  • 
ftaatsbienfk oom 3 . DKai 1852 neb$ 3Tad?tragen) bes greifiaates (Soburg loerben 
unter 5Uabrung after ibnen aus ibrer Qtnfteftung gujieljenben (Rccpte 00m barjerifcben "  
. © taa t ubernommen. .©as ©leicbe g ift fur bie mit anbcren ©taaten gemeinfc^aft- 
lichen 35eamtcn, foioeit-fie nacb ber Qluseinanberfeijung gioifcpcn ben greijiaaten 
Goburg unb ©otba auf ben © taa t (Soburg entfaften. ©en gur £e it an gotijaifc^en 
©ericbten angefteftten, aus bem greijiaat (Soburg fiammenben 3ufebcamten uoirb . 
; ber Qlnfprucb auf Ubernabme in ben baperifcpen 3 ufftgbien(t auf bie © auer oon 
brei JaMen 00m Qibfcbfuffc bes ©icatsoertrages an oorbcbaften.
gcrner ubernimmt ber barjenfcfie © taa t bie famftic^en bergcitigen 35eguge fur 
35eamte im Ovubejianbe, bann fur bie iointerbliebenen oon 35eamtcn,. foioeit gur • 
S^bM ng bie coburgtfcpe ©taats£affe oerpffi^tet i j i  ©agu geporen aud? fofcbe 
• Penfionslafien, bie (Soburg gufolge ber Qluseinanberfetjung mit bem greificat ©otba 
' 'ober anbcren © taaten gu tragen \)dt -Kunftige ©rbobungen ber bagerifcpen (Rube- ; 
gefrafte unb iointcrbftebenenbeguge bM>en aucb ben coburgifcben 35camten unb ibren 
-Spinterbfiebenen gugute gu fommen.
33ei ber (Sinfubrung bes. baperifcben T3ol!sfcbuftebrergefei*es in (Soburg finben 
bie oorficbcnben ©runbfafye auf bie Uoftsfcpuftebrcr entfpredjenbe Qlnioenbung.
. § ic.
© ie  in (Soburg befkbenben fkratftcben *5ilbungsan|kften uoerben aucb uoeiterbin 
erbaften oorbepattficb fofcber Qlnberungen, bie burcb eine aftgemcine QXeuorbnung 
im Unterricbtsuoeten notioenbig uoerben foftten.
§ n.
© ic  bisbcrigcn £eiftungcn bes ©taates an bie -Kircben in (Soburg uoerben 
- oom baijerifcben © taa t bis gur. Qluseinanberfctjung guoifdjen © taat unb tslircbe 
ubernommen.
§ 12. *
© ie  Qlmtsgericpte (Soburg, ^fteuftabt, (Robacb unb ©onnefelb bkiben bcficbcn, 
oorbepaftftcp oon Qlnbcrungen, bie ficp bei ber in Qlusfid;t fkpenbcn aftgcmcincn 
3(euorganiiatfon ber baperifcben ©cricbtc afs notioenbig crioeifcn. S e i bicfcr 3(cu- 
organilation uoerben binfid;t[id> ber coburgifcben Qlmtsgeridbtc bie glcicpen © runb - 
fatjc loie im £anbgericbtsbegirk Bamberg ma&gebenb fein.
(ix)
©  as 3Imtsgericbt $<5nigsberg uoirb rifcbt oor ber In QLus|tcf?t flebenben 
gemeinen 3Teuorganifation ber bagerifcben ©ericbte aufgebobcn uoerben. i-V;
'v;' • §  1 3 -  * J ' f
© ie Qlufbebung ber £anbgericbts- unb Oberlanbesgericbtsgemeinfcbaft mit. >: 
PreuBcn unb ben tburingifcben ©taaten if! berkeigufubren. © fe i*n Coburg beflebcnbe-,-. 
.hammer fur -Spanbelsfacben unb bie bortfge ©traf£ammer uoerben gu einem oo f t - T;; 
ffanbtgen £anbgericbte ausgebaut. ©abei uoerben bem neu gu erricbtenben £anb- 
gericbte (Soburg baijen'fcbe Qlmtsgericbtsbegir!e gugeteilt
§ *4- ' \X'
3m ©ebiet bes bisberigen greifiaates (Soburg uoerben £anb!ran!en£a(fcn im 
© inne bes § 225  ber (Reicbsoerficberungsorbnung nicbt erricbtct.
§ . 15. • >
gur ben g a ll ber ^ute lM ng bes ©ebietes bes greifiaates (Soburg gum U er- 
uoaltungsbegirc einer bagerifcben £anbcsoer{icberungsanj!alt bleibt bie Qlusflellung 
unb ber Hmtaufcb ber Q jiittungsikrten fouoie bie ©ingiebung, Ueruocnbung unb 
TSerrccbnung ber Q5eitrage gur 3 noaliben- unb -Gpmterbliebenenoerficberung gemaB ■
§ 1455 unb §§ 1447 ft  ber (Reicbsoerficberungsorbnung ben -Kranbcnilajicn iibertragcn. {
• § 16.
© ie coburgijcbc .lanb- unb forftuoirtfcbaftli<d>e ^erufsgenofienfcbaft mit bem ©ify ; 
in (Soburg bleibt befleben.
§ I?. .
3n (Soburg uoirb ein bem ©euoerberat bei ber (Regierung oon ’Oberfranren, \-  
■Kammer bes *3 nnern, nacbguorbnenber ©euoerbeaufficbtsbeamter aufgeflellt. ’3bm 
uoerben bie erforberlicben -loilfslrdfte beigegeben. i
§ 18. :
© ie -Gbanbelslammer (Soburg bleibt befleben. gu r ben g a ll einer allgemeinen 
3 (euregelung in (Saijern uoirb ibre Uberfubrung in eine 55egir!soertretung (ioanbets- ' . 
gremium) oorbcbalten.
© ie ioanbuoerrslammerabteilung (Soburg loirb gu einer felbflanbigen iQanb- 
uoerfs£ammer fur bas ©ebiet bes bisbcrigen greifiaates (Soburg mit Qlusnabme bes 
Qlmtes .Konigsberg in granlen ausgebaut. ;' i
§ 19-
3n bem Q3eflreben, bie "Derfcbrsbegicbungen guoifcben ben ©cbieten *3ar>crn 
unb (Soburg ben liinftigcn 35eburfniffen ber oereinigten, grciflaaten moglicbfl angu- 
paffen, uoirb bie barjerifcbc (Regicrung, fouoeit fie oor ber Ubernabme ber baijcrifcbcn 
©taatseijenbabncn auf bas (Reicb bagu nocb in ber £age ifl, bie (Srbauung eir.er .
:; £o!alSabn oon -Kaltenbrunn-Untermergbacb nad? O^offacb nacb bem in 35a9 cm gur 
£ e it nccb guttigcn £oIalSabrtgefei? oom 28 . Q lpril 18S2 mdgfrcbli forberri unb {lc^>
. Seim Xeid je  aud> bafur einfetjen, bafj cine £oIalSabrt oon -Kdnigsbofen i. ©rabfelb 
nacb Ovobad) innerbafb ber nacbffen 10 3 abrc nacb QlSfcpIuS bes ©taaisoertrages 
erSaut icerbe.
§ 2°.
© ie  Sarjerifcbe O^egferung tofrb bie 30efer -  £D3erra -  OKatnoerbtnbung nacb • 
■Krdften forbern. *
■ § 21 .
© ie  T>ertragfdbliebenben Sebalten fid? oor, loeitere 35ejlimmungcn burcb 3 U-  
fafyprotofolle gu treffen, bie in ibrer 30 ir!ung biefem "Dertrag gfeicrjgefJellt iDerben. .*
• § 22 . t •’
© ie  O^efcbsregi'erung fo il erfucf>t icerben, in bas IReicbsgefetj uber bfe "Ber- .
: einfgung Qoburgs mit Q^agern eine *5efh'mmung bes Gnbatts aufguneBmen, ba§ ber . 
Seitpunrt bes Gnlrafttretens bes O^eicbsgefetjes burcb "Berorbnung ber Saigerifcben !• 
IXegi'erung feflgcj"et*t loirb.
. D K i i nc b e n ,  ben 14. gebruar 1920.
Hoffmann. . • grang M ing le r.
. * ,. Dr.- (Srnft OKuIIer. ‘ ' • " Dr. ©rnfi oritfcb- ‘ v'.
©cbluSprotoBoII
311m ©taatafccctcag fcom 14.. ^c fitn a t 10£0 
uSec bie 33 cmrugurtg ©ofiurgd m it SSaycrn.
© ie uniergeicbnetcn ^eoollmdcbtigten icaren fjeute gufammer.geireien, um gum 
QLBfcblufle unb gur "Bodgiebung bes gur "Bereinigung Qoburgs mit 33aijem oerei’n- 
Sarren ©taatsoertrags gu fcbreiten. -Spierbei finb in bas gegenioariige ©cbfufjprotololl 
nacbilepenbe, mit ben "Bereinbarungen bes "Bertrags fclbft glefcb oerbinblicbe (Sr- 
Harungen aufgenommen loorben :
I.
© er Sarjen'fd;c © taat toirb bafiir ©orgc tragen, ba6 bie im bisbcrigen gre i- 
ftaat (Soburg Scficpcnbcn QBobftabrtseinricbtungen, insSefonbere fur bie © aug lings- 
furforge unb bie 35c£dmpfung ber tTuBcrfuIofe unb ber ©cfcblecbtscranlbciten im 
bisbcrigen Umfang erbalten bleiben.
(xi)
i;' :-; • • ’ ' • - II. /.
*3is [pdteflens 31 . ©cgember 1921 toirb bie Saijerifcfje ©emeinbegefetjgebung ;7 
in (Soburg eingcfubrt uoerben. Q5is gur ©infubrung bfeiben bie auf © runb bcr ri 
VC:.- coburgifcben Q5eflimmungen geuoabften Bertretungen (©emeinbeoorffanb, OKagiflrai, !,j 
'•'■*7 © tabtrat, ©emeinbeausfcbu§, ©tabtoerorbnetenoerfammfung) im Qlmt.. •  . . .7. ■ v - d r /
:Jv ■ in. •'
* \ -  © s bleibt oorbebalten, ber © tab t !Xobad> bie fsdeisunmitiefbarleit gu entgicben/
V f a l l s  fie nicbt binnen 15 3 abren can ber Bereinigung an bie in Q5agem geftenben '7 
' 7 Borausfeijungen fur bie Berfeibung ber -Slreisunmittelbarlcii erfufft.
•• ••■ © fe  ©tdbte QCeuflabt unb (Robacb uoerben auf bie Qlmtsbauer ber gegen-"7  
>/': uoariigen <5urgermeifler —  aucb im gaffe ibrer 3Bieberuoabf —  oon 'berQ3eflimmung ■}
. bes Q lrt 6 QLbf. V II bes ©elbfloeruoaftungsgefetses entbunben. , "
■ ‘ .  IV .
© as bisberige ffaatficbe £anb!ran!enbaus in (Soburg gebt mit famtfidjen '
•/ -Bermogcnsrecbten unb'Berpfficptungen auf einen f^ranfenbausoerbanb uber unb d 
uoirb oon biefem fur bie Buoede ber (Soburger Q3eooderung oeruoaltet. © e r Berbanb 
uoirb aus ben ©emeinben bes bisberigen greifiaates (Soburg mit Qfusnapme berer 
bes bisbcrigen Qlmtes -Sonigsberg in gran fen gebifbet. £ u r  Berftdrrung feiner .p', 
OKittel uoerben ibm bie gum ©omanenoermogcn gcpbrenben SfBeripaniere unb 
gorberungen gu ©igentum uberuoiejen. (Reicben bie ©inncbmen bes £anblranren- 
baufcs gur ©edung ber Qfusgcben nicbt aus, fo uoirb 00m baijcrifcpen © taa t ein ’■ 
3ufd)ub fn ber £>0be oon brei B iertef bes geblbetrages gugeficpert. ©em baperifcpen 
© taat bfeibt es unbenommen, bie SufcpuSleiflung burcb eine einmafige Q lbftnbungs-' • 
fumme abgufofen. Gbre iipdbc iff mit bem Berbanbe gu oereinbarcn. ^om m t eine - 
© inigung nicpt guffanbe, fo entfebeibet auf Qlntrag bes einen ober anberen tje ifes 7 
ber BeriDaftungsgericptsbof in DKuncben im fcbiebsgerid>tlicpen Berfabren. Obne . 
Sujlimmung ber ©egenfeite dann biefer Qlntrag nicbt oor Qlbfauf oon funf 3 ab^cn, 
oon ber Bereinigung an gereebnet, geflefft uoerben.
v.
©ie ©parlaffen bes greifiaates (Soburg uoerben in ber bisbcrigen Qlrt ibres 
©efcpaftsbetriebes nicbt befdprdnft. Obne ibre guflimmung lonnen auf fie bie bage- j
rifeben ©runbbeflimmungen uber ©padaffen nicbt erflredt uoerben.
VI.
© ie  Borfcpriften ber © tab t (Soburg uber bas geuerbeffattungsuoefen bfeiben j
unberiibri.
VII.
3 u  § g Qfbf. 1 bes ©taaisoertrages beflebt Bbercinflimmung, baft bie 33camten 
in fofebe baperifebe ©teffen gu ubernebmen finb, bie ibrcm ©cbaft, ibrem © ienfl-
(xii)
alter unb fbrer Borb ilbung entfprecben. Qtuf ibre bisberige bienfilfcbe © te llung uoirb 
0\ud ficb i genommen.- © ie  fur ben coburgifcben ©taatsbfenff abgelegten "Prufungcn 
, uoerben ben betreffenben baperifcben Priifungen gleicbgeacbtet. .7
V III.
© ie  Berlegung eines bagerifcben gorflamts nacb -Konigsberg in granlen uoirb 
gugeficpert. IX.
© ie  coburgifcbe (Regierung uoirb bafur forgen, ba§ ber baperifcben (Regierung 
im Borffanbe ber (Soburger £anbesftiftung eine nocb naber gu oereinbarcnbe B e r- 
. trctung eingeraumt uoirb. © ie  ©taatsaufficpt uber bie © tiftung uoirb oom baperifcpen 
©taatsminijlerium fur Bnterricpt unb Kluftus unmittelbar ausgcubt uoerben. ©s 
beflebt Bbereinjlimmung babin, ba§ bie Qlnjlellung ber ©tiftungsbeamten burcb 
biefes OKinijlerium auf ben gutacptlicben Borfcblag bes ©tiftungsoorfianbes pin erfolgt.
X .
© er bagerifcbe © taa t tritt blnffcb^Icb bes £anbestbeaters in (Soburg in ben 
guoifcben bem ©taate (Soburg unb ber ©tabtgemeinbe (Soburg untcrm g. QtugujI 
ig ig  gefcbfoffencn Bertrag ein.
X L
3£urbe bie QTeuorbnung bes £eprerbi[bungsuoefens bagu fiiprcn, ba§ befonbere, 
ber £cprcrbi[bung bicnenbe ©cpufen nocb beibebaltcn uoerben, fo uoirb bie ba^crifcpe 
(Regierung bas £ebrerfeminar in (Soburg ber Qteuorbnung ■ gemafe einricpien.
X II.
Q5ei ber © infubrung bes baijerifd)en Qlotariats finb bie coburgifcben QCotare 
gu entfcbabigen, fouoeit fie nicbt in ben bagcrifcbeh QCotariatsbienfl ubernommen uoerben.
X III.
© ie  coburgifcpe (Regierung uoirb babin uoirrcn, bafj bie Qluseinanberfepung 
mit bem grei(laat ©otba unb bie £ofung ber fonftigcn ©cmcinfcpaftsoertrdge, fouoeit • 
bcgiiglicp eingelner Bertrage mit ber baijerifdoen (Regferung nicpts anberes oercin- 
bart iff ober oereinbart uoirb, nocb oor ber Bereinigung (Soburgs .mit 33anern burcp- 
gefubrt uoirb. ©ouocit bieraus £aften fur bie bagcrifcpe ©taatscafte eruoacpfen, ijl 
bie 3 ufl‘"mmun9 Ber barjerifdoen (Regierung erforberiicp.
© ie  mit bem oereinbarten ©ntuourf ubereinflimmenb befunbenen guoei Qlus- 
fertigungen bes Bertrages finb b^erauf oon ben 35eDoIImadotigtcn untergcicpnct unb 
unterfiegelt uoorbcn, unb es bQBen bie ^eoollmacbtigtcn ber barjcnfcpcn unb ber 
coburgifcben (Regierung je eine Qlusfertigung bes Bertrages unb bes ©cplufj- 
protocods entgegengenommen.
OK u n cb e n , ben 14. gebruar ig 20 .
iipoftmann. * grang ^lingfer.
D r. © rn fl OKuQcr. D r. © rn il gritfeb.
(x'iii)
